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ABSTRACT 
This dissertation presents a study of the security and performance of a quantum 
communication system using multi-stage multi-photon tolerant protocols. Multi-stage 
protocols are a generalization of the three-stage protocol proposed in 2006 by Subhash 
Kak. Multi-stage protocols use “Polarization Hopping,” which is the process of changing 
the polarization state at each stage of transmission. During the execution of a multi-stage 
protocol, the message transfer always starts by encoding a bit of information in a 
polarization state; for example, bit 0 is encoded using state |0⟩ and bit 1 is encoded using 
state|1⟩ whereas, on the channel, the state of polarization is given by 𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩. In the 
following 𝛼 and 𝛽 are restricted to the real numbers i.e., the polarization stays on the 
equator of the Poincare sphere. A transformation applied by one communicating party at 
a given stage will result in new values of 𝛼 and 𝛽. 
This dissertation analyzes the security of multi-stage, multi-photon tolerant 
protocols and proposes an upper bound on the average number of photons per pulse in 
the cases where Fock states and the cases where coherent states are used in the 
implementation of the three-stage protocol. The derived average number of photons is the 
maximum limit at which the three-stage protocol can operate at a quantum secure level 
while operating in a multi-photon domain. In addition, this dissertation studies the 
vulnerability of the multi-stage protocol to the Trojan horse attack, Photon Number 
splitting attack (PNS), Amplification attack, as well as the man-in-the middle attack. 
Moreover, this dissertation proposes a modified version of the multi-stage protocol. This 
modified version uses an initialization vector and implements a chaining mode between 
consecutive implementations of the protocol. The modified version is proposed in the 
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case of the three-stage protocol and named a key/message expansion four variables three-
stage protocol. The proposed nomenclature is based on the fact that an additional variable 
is added to secure the three-stage protocol. The introduction of this additional variable 
has the potential to secure the multi-stage protocol in the multi-photon regime.  It results 
in the eavesdropper having a set of simultaneous equations where the number of variables 
exceeds the number of equations.  
The dissertation also addresses the performance of the multi-stage, multi-photon 
tolerant protocol. An average photon number of 1.5 photon/stage is used to calculate the 
maximum achievable distance and key transfer rates while using the single-stage protocol 
over fiber optic cables. We compute the increase in distance as well as data transfer rate 
while using the single-stage protocol. Channel losses as well as the detector losses are 
accounted for.  
Finally, an application of the multi-stage protocol in IEEE 802.11 is proposed. 
This application provides wireless networks with a quantum-level of security. It proposes 
the integration of multi-stage protocols into the four-way handshake of IEEE 802.11. 
 
1 
 
Chapter I: Introduction 
I. Cryptography 
The multiple human needs and desires that demand privacy among two or more people 
in the midst of social life must inevitably lead to cryptography wherever men thrive 
and wherever they write. 
-David Kahn    
 Cryptography is the art of secret writing. It is the field of applications that provide 
authentication, privacy, integrity, and confidentiality to users. Cryptography has 
performed an important role in the history of any society that depends on information [1]. 
An important subfield of cryptography is that of secure communication. This field aims 
at protecting any message transfer between communicating parties, such that no 
unauthorized party can access the content of a message in transit.  
Cryptography is the process of transforming information into something 
incomprehensible for anyone other than the intended users. The process of transformation 
is referred to as encryption; the reverse process is referred to as decryption. The 
information or message to be encrypted is referred to as plaintext; after encryption this 
information is called a cipher text. Along the centuries, many methods to encode 
messages emerged always to be broken at a later point of time. 
 Cryptographic methods are divided into symmetric and asymmetric key 
cryptography. Symmetric key cryptography is based on one secret key shared between 
two communicating parties. This key is used to effect both encoding and decoding of the 
messages to be communicated. The first provably secure cipher, the one-time pad, is 
based on symmetric cryptography. It was proposed around 1920 by Gilbert Vernam [2, 
3]. The one-time pad cipher is relatively simple to implement; the basic idea behind it is 
to have each symbol of the plaintext added modulo alphabet size to another symbol of a 
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random secret key. Together they form a cipher text that will undergo the exact same 
operation at the receiving end with the exact same symbol from the random key; now the 
cipher text is decrypted back into plaintext. The first formal proof of the security of the 
one-time pad was completed in 1949 by Claude Shannon. Shannon showed that the 
security of information is guaranteed if the key it is encrypted with is as long as the 
message and never reused [4]. The condition limiting the reusability of the key in a one-
time setup makes it impractical due to the need for a constant supply of large key material 
at both ends. 
After mid-1970s, cryptography became more widespread and it was essentially 
used by people in everyday life. Furthermore, cryptography became a tool not only for 
encryption, but also for other tasks such as digital signatures and various forms of 
authentication.  
Two major developments happened in that decade. The first was the release of a 
public standard of a symmetric cipher, Data Encryption Standard (DES). DES uses 
relatively short keys and it encrypts a large amount of data in a quick manner. Its original 
version is no longer considered secure; due to its limited key length of 56 bits, a dedicated 
hardware can crack it in less than 24 hours. Today in use are other symmetric ciphers that 
have longer keys. These symmetric ciphers are called Advanced Encryption Standards 
(AES)[5].  
The second development is the introduction of asymmetric ciphers or public key 
cryptography. The idea of public key cryptography was discovered by Diffie and Hellman 
in [6]. Rivest, Shamir, and Adleman were the first to provide a public key cryptography 
implementation [7]. Public key cryptography is based on a pair of keys for each 
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communicating party, namely, a public key for encryption and another private one for 
decryption. The public and private keys are connected together through a trapdoor one-
way function. In this case, the encryption function is a one-way operation that can be 
completed using the public key; however, decryption function is cumbersome unless the 
trapdoor is known, i.e., the private key. Besides encryption/decryption functionalities, 
public key cryptography allows signature on and authentication of a message.  
 Most of the modern systems rely on the usage of symmetric and asymmetric 
cryptography in tandem. Where public cryptography is the means for key distribution, 
distributed keys will be used in a symmetric key cipher to encode/decode messages. Thus, 
the security of these systems hinges on the existence of trapdoor one-way functions and 
on the strength of symmetric ciphers.  Nevertheless, neither of these conditions has been 
formally proven. Particularly, the possibility of having a quantum computer along with 
highly efficient factorization algorithms cannot be neglected. Then, not only 
cryptographic techniques in use today become insecure but the techniques become secure 
retroactively, thus creating a high risk for all applications where data keeps its value for 
a long time.  
 Quantum physics has changed the landscape of cryptography in the last two 
decades. This has been done by introducing quantum cryptography; in other words, 
cryptosystems that are based on quantum physic laws to provide unconditionally secure 
data transfer. Quantum Cryptography (QC) is mainly used for key distribution and called 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD). QC and QKD are discussed throughout the next 
section.  
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II. Quantum World  
Anyone who is not shocked by quantum theory has not understood it. 
-Niels Bohr 
Quantum information theory was established in the beginning of the last century. 
Its fundamental concept relies on quantum bits, or qubits, for short. Classical physics 
cannot be used to describe the behavior of a quantum system. The unique and counter-
intuitive aspects of quantum theory are exploited to the benefit of quantum cryptography. 
The fundamental concepts that quantum cryptography relies on are as follows: 
Information gain vs. disturbance: This aspect of quantum physics forms “the 
engine that powers quantum cryptography” [8]. In the simplest QC implementations, the 
bits of a message are encoded using photon polarization. To gain any information about 
the polarization of these qubits, an intruder must observe them. In other words, an intruder 
should measure the state of the communicated qubit. Since the polarization states used 
are non-orthogonal, such a measurement is destructive and disturbs the qubit’s state. This 
phenomenon is described by the Heisenberg uncertainty principle stating that some pairs 
of quantum properties are complementary in a way such that measuring one of them will 
necessarily disturb the other. Consequently, an eavesdropper tapping on the quantum 
channel can be noticed in a statistically detectable way. This fundamental concept does 
not apply to classical cryptography where a classical bit can be read while being 
transmitted. In classical cryptography the security of the transmission relies solely on the 
security of the encryption cipher used. 
An unknown quantum state cannot be copied:  This fact is formalized in the no-
cloning theorem [9]. The no-cloning theorem states that the unknown state of a photon 
cannot be copied exactly and deterministically. It is worth noting that this fact constitutes 
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a major security feature in quantum cryptography. It is, however, unheard of in the 
classical information domain.  
i. Polarization Concept  
 Photons are the most popular carrier of quantum key bits; they have an intrinsic 
property called polarization [10]. Most of the QKD protocols available so far utilize the 
polarization states of photons to realize the key distribution [11]. The concept of 
polarization and its importance in quantum cryptography will be described briefly.  
 Light is an electromagnetic wave that bounces back and forth as it propagates in 
a medium. This electromagnetic wave is composed of photons, and it can be described 
by an electric field and a magnetic field that are perpendicular and proportional to each 
other. Light waves exhibit the phenomenon of polarization. Considering the polarization 
state of light, one need to consider only one of its components, either the magnetic or the 
electric field, since they are correlated and the knowledge of one fulfills the knowledge 
of the other. Usually the electric field is considered when talking about a polarization 
state. 
 Light may be either polarized or un-polarized. According to the projection of the 
electric field vector on the plane perpendicular to the travel direction of the light, 
polarized light can be either linearly polarized, circularly polarized or anywhere between 
them called elliptically polarized, as shown in Figure 1. 
6 
 
 
Figure 1: (a) Linear, (b) circular and (c) elliptical polarizations of light 
 
The description of polarization of electromagnetic waves translate directly to that for a 
single photon. So choosing two linear orthogonal polarization axes, one can represent a 
vertically polarized photon by |𝑉⟩, and a horizontally polarized photon by |𝐻⟩. The 
general state is described by the Dirac notation, 
|𝜓⟩ =   𝛼𝑉 |𝑉⟩ + 𝛼𝐻 |𝐻⟩       
(Don’t your equations need to be numbered in parentheses and positioned flush right?) 
where 𝛼𝑉 and 𝛼𝐻 are the probability amplitudes and |𝛼𝑉|
2+|𝛼𝐻|
2=1 [12]. Thus, the state 
of the photon polarization is mathematically described by a vector of a unit length.  
 Any two orthogonal polarizations form a basis and the photon polarization can be 
expressed in terms of that basis. For example[12] , linearly polarized photons along the 
diagonals can be written as: 
|𝐷⟩ = |
𝜋
4
⟩ = (|𝐻⟩ + |𝑉⟩)/√2         
|𝐴⟩ = |
−𝜋
4
⟩ = (|𝐻⟩ − |𝑉⟩)/√2    
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In conventional quantum cryptography, we mainly use two bases: the (+) or rectilinear 
basis which is {|𝐻⟩, |𝑉⟩} basis, and the (×) or diagonal basis which is {|𝐷⟩, |𝐴⟩} basis. 
 Photons, individually, are completely polarized; their polarization state can be 
linear, circular or elliptical. Let us suppose that we want to prepare a stream of 
horizontally polarized photons by sending them through a horizontal polarizing filter. 
Furthermore, let us suppose that we want subsequently to measure the polarization of 
those photons by sending them through a second polarizing filter. We find that only when 
the measurement filter is in vertical position, no photons pass through it. For all the other 
orientations some photons will pass through it. 
According to quantum physics laws, each photon in a stream has a certain probability 
to pass through the measurement filter. The probability is dependent on the orientation of 
the measurement filter and varies from 0 to1. Taking the same example as above when 
the light is horizontally polarized, each photon will have a probability 1 to pass through 
the measurement filter when it is in the horizontal position. This probability will decrease 
to 1 2⁄  at 
𝜋
4⁄  and 0 when the filter is vertically positioned[13].  
ii. Quantum Cryptography 
 Quantum cryptography or quantum key distribution applies the fundamental laws 
of physics described earlier to guarantee unconditionally secure information transfer from 
a sender, Alice, to a receiver, Bob. It enables Alice and Bob to produce and share a 
random secret key that can be used later on for encryption and authentication 
functionalities. QKD promises unconditional security unlike its classical counterpart that 
relies on computational complexity and unproven assumptions. QKD first started with 
BB84 [14] . BB84 was proposed by Bennet and Brasard in 1984. They were the first to 
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realize that quantum states are meant to exchange information rather than storing it. The 
latter was first proposed by Stephen Wiesner in 1970. Wiesner proposed the idea of 
Quantum Money by designing bank notes and making them impossible to forge 
using quantum physics. That is done by assigning a series of isolated two-state quantum 
systems to each bank note in addition to its unique serial number[15]. An example is 
attaching to the bank note photons in one of four polarizations states: 0, 
𝜋
4
, 
𝜋
2
 and 
2𝜋
3
. Each 
of these is a two-state system in one of two bases: the rectilinear basis has states with 
polarizations at 0 and 
𝜋
2 
 to the vertical and the diagonal basis has states at 
𝜋
4
 and 
2𝜋
3
 to the 
vertical. 
At the bank, a record of all the polarizations and the corresponding serial numbers is 
present. The serial number is printed on the bank notes, meanwhile the polarizations states 
are kept secret. This means that the bank can always verify the polarizations without 
introducing any disturbance, whereas counterfeiter cannot without forging the bank note. 
Later on several other protocols were proposed as alternatives to the BB84, such as 
B92 [16], the six-state protocol [17],BBM92 [18], and  SARG04 [19]. QKD needs both 
a quantum channel as well as a classical channel. The quantum channel can be insecure; 
however, the classical one requires previous authentication. Unconditionally secure 
classical authentication schemes do exist and an example is Wegman-Carter 
authentication scheme [20, 21]. In addition, such schemes authenticate an initial key or 
message between Alice and Bob. QKD is referred to as key expansion protocols, which 
is an impossible task in the case of classical cryptography. Thus, QKD provides a solution 
to a problem not solvable using classical means.  
The steps of the most widely known QKD protocol are as follows: 
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1. Alice randomly chooses one of two polarization bases to encode her bits. The 
bases are × or + . In other words she can choose one of two non-orthogonal states 
to encode each bit with. Bit 0 can be encoded with either 0 or 
𝜋
4
 polarization, 
whereas bit 1 can be encoded using 
𝜋
2 
 or 
3𝜋
4
 polarization. After encoding Alice 
sends the qubit to Bob through the quantum channel. 
2.  Bob randomly chooses the × or + basis to measure the received qubit. Bob keeps 
his measurement result secret. 
3. On the classical channel, Alice and Bob compare the basis they choose for 
encoding and measuring the exchanged qubits. This step is called reconciliation; 
during it half of the bits are discarded. 
4.  Alice and Bob implement error correction and privacy amplification to extract 
the final key.   
iii. An Eavesdropping Example  
 A simple example of eavesdropping is the case where an intercept and resend 
attack is carried on by Eve. In this attack Eve does the exact same process done at Bob’s 
side; she intercepts the photon coming from Alice, measures it in either + or × basis. At 
this point, Eve can either resend the same photon to Bob which is only possible in the 
case where she does her measurement in the same basis that Alice did the encoding at her 
side. In this case, Eve has the exact same information that Alice encoded. However, if 
she chooses a basis different than the one Alice prepared the state with, her result will be 
uncorrelated with that of Alice’s. Moreover, Eve would have modified the state in such a 
way even if Bob uses the same basis as Alice, half of the times he will get a wrong result. 
Over a long keys length this attack will give Eve information on half of the bits of the 
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key while introducing a quantum bit error rate 𝑄 = 0.25. The QBER introduced by Eve 
makes her presence noticeable by both Alice and Bob. 
iv. Unconditional Security and Its Conditions 
 
  The main reason behind the need of QKD is the fact that it can achieve 
unconditional security. In other words, the security of a QKD protocol can be proved 
without posing any constraint on the eavesdropping techniques available to Eve. QKD is 
said to be capable of achieving unconditional security due to its quantum physics roots. 
An eavesdropper, Eve, must interact with the quantum system in order to gain information 
about the transmitted state. Such interactions can be quantitatively measured. For 
instance, when Alice uses randomly chosen non-orthogonal states to encode the 
transmitted message, Eve’s intervention will certainly modify the encoded state resulting 
in errors observable at both Alice’s and Bob’s sides.  Such errors place the computation 
of a limit on Eve’s information about the encoded state. 
At this point one should mention that the term unconditional security is different 
from absolute security; security in its absolute sense does not exist.  In reality, 
unconditional security claimed in QKD exists only under certain conditions. The 
compulsory requirements for unconditionally secure QKD are as follows [22] : 
1. An eavesdropper, Eve, cannot intrude Alice’s and Bob’s devices. In addition, 
he/she cannot tamper with their setting choices, such as the basis choice. 
2. The random number generator much be fully trusted by Alice and Bob. This 
generator is used to select the state to be sent at Alice’s side and the measurement 
basis choice at Bob’s side. 
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3. Unconditionally secure authentication protocols [20, 21, 23] must be used to 
authenticate the classical channel.  
4. An eavesdropper has to obey the law of quantum physics. In other words, the 
security of the QKD protocols is based on a restricted set of quantum physics 
laws. 
 The failure of these requirements would compromise the security of a QKD 
protocol. However, it must be noted that the stated conditions only promise theoretical 
security; unconditional security is not guaranteed at the implementation level. For an 
implementation to be unconditionally secure, the theoretically described quantum states 
should match the signals that will be exchanged in reality. In addition, the implementation 
must be free of any unwanted information leakage.  
v. Limitations of quantum key distribution   
The notion of key distribution using quantum states is a significant development 
in the field of security. It is the only way of securing communication in the era of quantum 
computers. However, this impressive field of science is still in its immature phase and 
has several restrictions. The limitations associated with a system implementing the BB84 
QKD protocol can be described as follows:  
1. Photon Sources: 
The security of current implementations of QKD using BB84 is bound to single 
photon states. In other words, it is essential that Alice generates single photon 
states. Otherwise, in case states having more than a single photon are generated, 
an eavesdropper will be able to launch a photon number splitting attack (PNS). 
During a PNS attack, the eavesdropper will have access to the additional photon/s 
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generated by Alice and will analyze them and get the information he/she needs. 
Such an attack will go undetected. 
Current implementations use faint laser pulses since it turns out achieving single 
photon sources is difficult. Therefore, most time slots will be empty, a few would 
have single photons and very few more than a single photon.  
2. Distance of Communication: 
Due to detector noise and fiber losses, the range of current quantum key 
distribution systems is limited to 60-100 Km [24-26].In addition, this limitation 
can be associated with the fact that BB84 and its variants are single photon based 
protocols with average number of photons per pulse much less than 1. 
3. Data Rates 
In today’s fiber optic communication systems transmission rates on the order of 
Gigabits are easily attainable, but that is not the case with QKD. This is due to the 
limitation of no more than a single photon per pulse causing a large number of 
empty pulses, as well as the sifting process that truncates half of the possible key. 
This sets a limit in the use of QKD in conjunction with the one-time pad protocol 
to all but the most confidential transmissions. However, implementing QKD with 
AES or any other symmetric cipher is possible and can offer great improvement 
to the security of any system. 
4. Security 
Despite the fact that QKD’s unconditional security has been proven, any 
implementation will be susceptible to attacks at the device level. Nevertheless, a 
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security breach caused by a flaw in a device can be, in general, easier to deal with 
compared to a huge breakdown due to unproven mathematical assumptions.   
III. Scope and Contributions of the Dissertation 
 The specific aim of this dissertation is to address the limitations associated with 
the current practice of QKD. As discussed earlier, BB84 and its variants are based on 
single photons to provide unconditionally secure communication. This dissertation 
presents the novel notion of multi-photon tolerant protocols, where an unconditional 
quantum secure key or message transfer can be established without the need for single 
photon based protocols. 
 Multi-photon tolerant protocols use what we call polarization hopping (described 
in the next chapters) to secure transfer data. Multi-photon tolerant protocols introduced 
in this dissertation are multi-stage protocols with 𝑚 denoting the number of stages used 
for communication.  
 A version of the multi-photon tolerant multi-stage protocols using an initialization 
vector as well as chaining mode of operation is proposed. A laboratory implementation 
of this version of multi-stage protocols using half wave plates is presented. This 
implementation uses the case where 𝑚 = 3. 
 This dissertation sets the physical limit at which a multi-stage, multi-photon 
tolerant protocol can operate in the quantum secure area. This limit is the average number 
of photons that can be used by Alice and Bob. The average number of photons is 
calculated for the cases where Alice and Bob use Fock states as well as coherent states 
discussed in Chapters 4 and 5. An increase in the average number of photons is realized 
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as compared to the BB84 protocol where the average number of photons per pulse used 
is 0.1 − 0.6.  
 This dissertation uses the average number of photons associated with the multi-
photon tolerant protocols in order to evaluate their performance Fiber Optics (FO). In 
addition, this dissertation proposes an application of the multi-stage protocols in the IEEE 
802.11 standard. 
IV. Organization of the Dissertation 
 This dissertation aims to address a few of the disadvantages associated with 
current QKD implementations. It first starts (Chapter 2) with a background on the some 
of the currently used QKD protocols along with their disadvantages. In addition, Chapter 
2 introduces the concept of QKD networks along with descriptions of a couple of practical 
implementations. 
The rest of this dissertation consists of three main parts. The first part (Chapter 3) 
deals with the concept of the multi-stage protocol. It mainly describes the three-stage 
protocol where m= 3 . The details of its operation as well as its implementation are 
discussed. The implementation provided is an Free Space Optics laboratory 
implementation using half wave plates. The analytical reasoning behind the usage of the 
half wave plates at particular angles is provided using Mueller matrices. In addition, this 
part presents the three-stage protocol using an initialization vector and chaining mode to 
provide an extra layer of security. We call this version of the three-stage protocol the 
four-variable three-stage protocol. An FSO laboratory implementation of the four-
variable three-stage protocol is proposed as well. 
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 The second part of this dissertation (Chapters 4 and 5) addresses the limit on the 
average number of photons at which the multi-photon tolerant protocol provides quantum 
level security. The main basis of this work is the fact that a measurement an eavesdropper 
applies on a quantum state will result in an unavoidable quantum noise at the receiving 
end of the channel. The cases where Fock states as well as coherent states used are 
addressed in the context of Photon number splitting attack, Trojan horse attack, Man-in-
the-middle attack and Amplification attack. It is proven that an increased average number 
of photons can be achieved while attaining quantum- security. In addition, in Chapter 4 a 
comparison between an implementation of the BB84 protocol with that of a multi-stage 
protocol is presented. 
 The third part of this dissertation (Chapters 6) provides a theoretical comparison 
of the performance of a multi-stage protocol where 𝑚 = 1 with that of the BB84 protocol 
using FO communications (Chapter 6). An increase in the distance as well as the key 
generation rate is computed and presented.  
Chapter 7, proposes an application of the multi-photon multi-stage protocol in the 
field of wireless communication. The multi-stage protocol is introduced as a means of 
key distribution in the IEEE 802.11 wireless standard. 
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Chapter 2: Quantum Key Distribution 
Quantum communication is considered as the natural continuation of classical 
communication in the era of emerging quantum technologies. Quantum communication 
offers the promise of virtually unbreakable encryption; in other words, unconditional 
security. As discussed in Chapter 1, the main application of Quantum Key Distribution is 
in the field of quantum cryptography. QKD was first proposed by Bennett and Brassard 
in 1984; they were the first to discover that quantum states are meant to transfer 
information rather than store it.  
The main focus of this chapter is to address three essential points in the quantum 
communication world. First is the discussion of a few quantum key distribution protocols 
proposed so far. Second is the discussion of the disadvantages of these key distribution 
schemes.  And the third is the notion of a quantum network and its realizations. First, the 
BB84 protocol is described in detail along with its implementation and vulnerabilities. 
B92 and SARG04 are the two variants of the BB84 protocol and are discussed in this 
chapter as well. Second, the disadvantages of QKD are discussed. Chapter 1 did shed 
light on a few of these disadvantages. This chapter will discuss them in further detail. The 
need for QKD is addressed along with the timing when such key distribution schemes 
will become desirable for deployment. Third, this chapter discusses the innate point-to-
point nature of quantum communication links besides the type of quantum networks that 
can be generated using such links. Quantum networks can be split into three major types: 
quantum node networks, optical node networks, and trusted relay networks. This chapter 
discusses the BBN DARPA QKD network [27], as well as the SECOQC network [28].  
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I. Quantum Key Distribution Protocols 
Quantum mechanics is the basis on which quantum key distribution protocols rely 
to transfer and share keys. In order for this to be translated into a working cryptographic 
key distribution protocol, a combination of quantum processing as well as classical 
procedures is needed. Quantum key distribution protocols are usually subdivided into 
three main stages: raw key exchange, key sifting, and key distillation.  
The raw key exchange is the only quantum part in the overall quantum key 
distribution process. It is the only stage at which quantum states are transmitted between 
the communicating parties. Key sifting is the direct step following the raw key exchange; 
it is done over the classical channel in order to agree which bits to discard and which ones 
to keep. This is followed by the step of key distillation where error correction and privacy 
amplification are performed.  This section addresses the details of the BB84 along with a 
brief discussion of B92, and SARG04. 
i. BB84  
This section discusses the BB84 protocol. As mentioned earlier, it was the first 
proposed quantum key distribution protocol; it has been described in detail [1, 29]. 
Several proofs have been developed in order to show that it is unconditionally secure [30-
32].  The steps of key exchange and key sifting are done as follows and depicted in Figure 
2:   
1. Alice encodes each photon with its corresponding polarization state. Each bit of 
information can be encoded either in the rectilinear (0 or 
𝜋
2
) or diagonal (
𝜋
4
 or 
−𝜋
4
) 
basis. For example, if Alice chooses to encode her bit 1 in the rectilinear basis, 
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she will polarize her photon to 
𝜋
2
. However, if she wants to encode it in the 
diagonal basis she will polarize her photon to 
−𝜋
4
.  
2. It is worth noting that the choice of either the rectilinear or the diagonal basis has 
equal probability. At this point Alice can produce a stream of photons randomly 
polarized. The choice of the polarization basis is done using a trusted random 
number generator.  
3. Alice sends the stream of polarized photons over the quantum channel to Bob. 
Bob at his side will detect them. The BB84 protocol is referred to as a Prepare and 
Measure protocol (P&M). 
4. At this point Bob has to detect the received photons and measure the polarizations 
to be able to get the encoded bit. Since Bob does not know which basis has been 
used by Alice, he will set the measurement basis randomly using a trusted random 
generator as well. If he chooses the correct basis, he will record an accurate 
measurement. If not, the result will be random and will not match the one sent by 
Alice.  
5. The key exchange stage is now completed. Now the key sifting stage will start. 
At this point, Alice and Bob discuss their bases. No key information can be gained 
by an eavesdropper since the keys are not discussed publicly. They will discard 
all the bits where different bases have been used. These steps come at high cost; 
almost 50% of the raw key bits are discarded in order to generate what we call a 
sifted key.  
19 
 
 
Figure 2: Alice and Bob using the BB84 protocol for raw key exchange and sifting. 
Source: [33] 
 
Alice and Bob can identify the presence of an eavesdropper on the channel by 
calculating the QBER introduced over the channel. This has been explained in detail in 
Chapter 1. However, Table 1 shows how the presence of Eve on the quantum channel can 
be known. 
 
Table 1: BB84 exchange during the presence of an Eavesdropper 
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At this point, both Alice and Bob have in their possession a sifted key. They will 
start the step of key distillation; it is a one-way post-processing procedure consisting of 
two steps: error correction (EC) and privacy amplification (PA). During this procedure if 
the sender is the same as the one who sent the quantum states during the raw key 
exchange, one can speak of a direct reconciliation. Otherwise, the post-processing 
procedure is referred to as reverse reconciliation.  
The error correction step is also called information reconciliation. During this step 
Alice and Bob will generate a corrected sifted key. The corrected sifted key is shorter 
than the raw key and has perfectly correlated bits. According to Claude Shannon, the 
mutual information given by 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) = 𝐻(𝐴) + 𝐻(𝐵) − 𝐻(𝐴𝐵) is the fraction of 
perfectly correlated keys that can be extracted from the partially correlated sifted keys. 
This means that the sender must reveal an amount of information at least as large as the 
uncertainty the receiver has on the sifted key in order to be able to extract the perfectly 
correlated keys.  
The privacy amplification step is the second step of the post-processing 
procedure. The aim behind PA is to destroy any information Eve has on the sifted key. 
The fraction of the key to be discarded is equal to min (𝐼𝐸𝐵, 𝐼𝐸𝐴); 𝐼𝐸 is Eve’s information 
about the sifted key of Alice and Bob. PA was first addressed in [34]; however after the 
introduction of the notion of universally composable security [35, 36] it was replaced by 
a more general version [36]. A PA procedure that works in a provable manner is based 
on two-universal hash functions. In summary, the extractable fraction of the key using 
one-way post processing is given by:   
𝑟 = 𝐼(𝐴: 𝐵) − min(𝐼𝐸𝐴 , 𝐼𝐸𝐵) 
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 Other forms of post-processing procedure exist, such as the two-way post-
processing. In this type of post-processing both Alice and Bob can be senders and the 
bounds on the extractable portion can be significantly improved [37-39]. In addition, pre-
processing has been introduced to improve these bounds. Pre-processing is a procedure 
that can be completed before post-processing, in order to increase the randomness of the 
data possessed by Alice and Bob. This procedure can be either one-way or two-way. By 
adding local randomness to the data shared between Alice and Bob, a decrease in the 
correlations between them can be seen. However, this procedure decreases Eve’s 
information as well and can have an overall positive effect [40, 41]. Both pre-processing 
and two-way processing are relatively simple to implement and allows extraction of a 
fraction of the keys in regions where one-way post-processing fails.  
Photon Number Splitting Attack  
 It might appear that Eve has no options for obtaining useful information from the 
key exchange without being detected. However, the BB84 protocol has several 
underlying assumptions about the operation of the protocol in addition to the conditions 
described in Chapter 1, Section II. iv regarding the capabilities of Alice, Bob, and Eve.  
 It is assumed that Alice has in her possession a perfect single-photon source 
capable of generating on demand polarized single photons. Practical implementations of 
BB84 use unreliable photon sources that cannot achieve this requirement. Weak coherent 
pulses are used in such implementations, they generate with a finite probability empty 
pulses, pulses with single photons, and pulses with multi-photons. Having pulses with 
more than a single photon is a major weakness in the implementation of the BB84. It 
gives Eve the opportunity to siphon off surplus photons and measure them. This attack is 
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known as the Photon Number Splitting Attack (PNS) and was first identified by Brassard 
et al. in 2000 [42].  
   During a PNS attack, Eve effects a quantum non-demolition measurement. After 
siphoning off the photon successfully, Eve will have to wait until the communication of 
the bases over the classical channel happens and then she can measure the siphoned 
photons with 100% accuracy. During this attack, Eve’s presence will go unnoticed since 
it does not contribute to the QBER.  
 Counteracting PNS Attacks   
To counteract a PNS attack the communicating parties can choose to use one of 
the following two methods: 
Using reference pulses: In general reference pulses are signal pulses stronger than the 
message pulses sent at regular intervals by Alice [16]. Reference pulses contain multiple 
photons. In case reference pulses are used while Eve tries to launch a PNS attack, she will 
intercept a genuine single photon pulse or the reference pulse and record an error at Bob’s 
side. Thus, using reference pulses the presence of Eve can be detected. 
Using decoy states: Decoy pulses can be used to counter a PNS attack in the cases where 
the quantum channel is characterized with high losses. A noisy channel is the ideal 
condition for Eve to launch an extended photon number splitting attack [43].Decoy states 
were  first proposed in [44].   
ii. B92 
 
The B92 protocol was introduced by Bennet in 1992 as a variant of the BB84 
protocol [16]. The B92 results in a lower key efficiency than that of the BB84; however, 
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only half of the state preparation hardware is required. Compared to BB84, B92 has the 
following differences [45]: 
1) B92 requires only two non-orthogonal states instead of the four required in BB84. 
2) Alice on her side prepares a string of random bits 𝐴𝑖; she encodes the photons in 
two non- orthogonal states. Let us say bit 0 is encoded using |𝐻⟩ and bit 1 is 
encoded using  |
𝜋
4
⟩. Alice now sends her photons to Bob. 
3) On his side Bob prepares a random binary string 𝐵𝑖 and chooses his measurement 
basis accordingly. For example, bit 0 represents the rectilinear basis and bit 1 
represents the diagonal basis. Now Bob measures each quantum state received 
from Alice with the basis he chose. 
4) Now if Bob detects |𝐻⟩ he will register bit 0; however, if he detects |
𝜋
4
⟩ he will 
register bit 1. These bits are registered in a string 𝑇𝑖; this string will be sent to 
Alice and only the bits where 𝑇𝑖 = 1 are kept.   
iii. SARG04 
 
The SARG04 protocol was proposed in 2004 [19] as an alternative of the BB84 
protocol. SARG04 can be considered as a generalization of the BB84 protocol using B92 
to become more robust to the photon number splitting attack. In its original version 
SARG04 uses polarization states to transfer quantum bits from Alice to Bob; however, 
there exists a version of SARG04 which uses entangled photons[46].   
 Alice encodes her states in one of four non-orthogonal states and sends them to 
Bob. On his side, Bob selects one of two bases in order to measure them. Looking at the 
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operation of the protocol over the quantum channel, SARG04 operates in the same way 
as BB84. However, the fundamental difference between the two protocols lies in the key 
sifting process. During the sifting stage, Alice reveals the states she has used and one of 
the states that code to the other value of the bit. The second state revealed is not 
orthogonal to the first. If there are no errors in Bob’s guessing, the sifting process will 
result in a key with a length equal to 3 4⁄  that of the raw key.  
 Now, let us consider the case where Eve carries out a PNS attack on a SARG04 
setup. If she siphons off a photon she can only know that the state is in one of two non-
orthogonal states, which is not the case with BB84 where she will gain full information 
after public key discussion.  However, Eve’s best bet is to perform measurements on 
three-photon pulses; in this case her success probability is limited to1 2⁄ .  
 The SARG04 protocol provides the same level of security as that of the BB84 
only when perfect single-photon sources are available. In the cases where PNS attacks 
are a threat to BB84, SARRG04 provides a higher level of security compared to BB84. 
However, BB84’s performance in a noisy environment is more efficient since at a given 
channel visibility the QBER of SARG04 is twice that of BB84. 
 
II. Challenges to Quantum Key Distribution 
 
As mentioned earlier, QKD is still in its immature phases. A mass of issues are 
restricting its appeal within the cryptography community. Some of the problems with 
QKD were discussed in Chapter 1; this section will discuss them in more detail along 
with a few additions. 
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i. Denial of Service 
 
The point-to-point nature of the quantum channel results in it having unique 
characteristics. During quantum communication, Alice and Bob should be online and 
available at both ends of the communication channel equipped with sources and detectors 
in order for the exchange to take place. This is the opposite to the collection of 
connections of which the Internet is formed. The refined small world architecture of the  
Internet described in [47] allows distant regions to be connected. Using QKD only point-
to-point communication is possible; this restricts the potential growth and makes it more 
vulnerable to denial of service attacks. In such attacks if Eve is not able to obtain any key, 
she will simply cut the communication channel. This attack is at the heart of motivations 
to develop a quantum key distribution network. 
ii. Photon sources and detectors      
As discussed earlier, the quality of photon sources and detectors have a significant 
impact on the performance of the implementation of the QKD protocol. Less than perfect 
single photon sources in single-photon based protocols raise the vulnerability to PNS 
attacks. In addition, the detectors have several practical issues such as dark counts and 
dead time which can be exploited by an attacker. The criteria of ideal detectors are as 
follows [24]: 
1. High efficiency over a large spectral range 
2. Low dark counts probability 
3. Constant time between detection of a photon and the corresponding electric 
signal 
4. Small dead time after photon detection 
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Detectors are always different; a mismatch in the dead time of rectilinear and 
diagonal basis will always be present. Eve can observe this and control the arrival time 
of photons at Bob’s side and give higher probability of a reading on one of Bob’s 
detectors. She can then make a reasonable guess of the qubit sent [48]. In addition, Eve 
can always launch an attack on the implementation called the Trojan horse attack. During 
this procedure, she will shine a bright light into Bob’s detector and analyze its 
backscattering.  This process is called reflectometry [49]. 
iii. Losses in the Quantum Channel   
 
Quantum properties are adversely affected by the distance that a pulse is traveling. 
Free-space optical channels incur losses on the quantum signal due to atmospheric as well 
as equipment dependent geometric losses. On the other hand, in fiber optics the pulses 
suffer from decoherence, chromatic dispersion, and polarization mode dispersion. This 
type of loss affects the quantum signal irreversibly. They introduce security weaknesses 
as well as limit the distance and rate of quantum communication.  
iv. Security Proofs 
 
Security proofs are not equal to proven security since all security poofs make 
major assumptions. Some of these assumptions are not realistic and cannot be accurately 
translated in implementation setup. Most significant assumptions are about Alice and 
Bob’s capabilities [50]. These capabilities are idealized in some security proofs. 
Examples of these instances are provided in [22]. 
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v. Classical Authentication    
 
The post processing in any quantum key distribution protocol is usually done over 
the public channel. In addition, there is the need to have strong authentication algorithms 
in order to prevent the man-in-the-middle attack. This means that the overall security of 
the QKD protocol can be reduced to only the security of the authentication algorithm used 
at the onset of the protocol. However the use of Carter Wegman algorithms [20, 21] give 
unconditionally secure authentication. 
vi. Side Channel Attacks 
The attack using this kind of inconsistency between the theoretical protocol and 
its hardware implementation is usually called side channel attacks. This type of attacks 
occurs when an eavesdropper can extract information from a cryptosystem indirectly.  
Since QKD is still in its immature phases, it did not have the chance to have rigorous 
research in this type of information leakage. An example of such instances in QKD is 
when photon detectors in the receiver are controlled by sending tailored optical pulses 
through the quantum channel. This was not considered to take place in the security proofs. 
Among various side channel attacks, those related to photon detectors are serious because 
they are usually common to most of the QKD schemes. An example is the blinding attack 
with bright light [51, 52] , the implementations of its countermeasures were reported [53, 
54]. 
vii. Key management  
To be effective, QKD must employ an overall key management scheme. This 
scheme should deal with key storage, maintenance, and destruction once the useful 
lifetime of the key is up. This is a challenging task especially when QKD is to be used 
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with a one-time pad scheme since key management is often difficult. This is due to the 
fact that the key should be the same at both the sending and receiving ends as well as the 
fact that it should be totally random and never reused. In addition, a classically 
authenticated channel for the implementation of a QKD protocol can itself present a 
challenge and an overhead.  
Thus, key management is not only important but it is crucial for any cryptosystem 
to succeed. Key management is the hardest aspect of a system based on QKD since it 
should meet the organizational challenges to ensure that the key remains secure at any 
point of time in its life-cycle.   
viii. Need for QKD Based Crypto-systems  
One of the most important issues facing QKD is whether it is actually needed at 
all! Researchers have a range of different opinions. Some of them consider QKD as a 
solution looking for a problem with no existing or forthcoming use [55-57]; the rest regard 
QKD as the rescuer because cryptography as we know it is destined to fail [58].  
Cryptography is the success story of the information security world.  If it is 
properly implemented, it can enable sensitive information to be transmitted securely in 
an insecure environment. For practical purposes security as known today can prove to be 
an extremely strong defense mechanism. A system failure might be due to poor key 
management or human failure rather than due to a cryptographic scheme failing.    
The promise of unconditional security through QKD can be ideal for certain 
applications e.g., banking. However, for it to have an industrial appeal, it must be directed 
into solving a business problem, save money and/or make a procedure more efficient. 
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Research and development continues to increase the efficiency of QKD algorithms as 
well as reduce the cost of the equipment needed for deployment of such technology.  
Bruce Schneier states that “Security is a chain: it is as strong as its weakest 
link”[55].This is why he described QKD “as awesome as it is pointless” [55]. 
Strengthening the strongest link will prompt hackers to look somewhere else in the 
network for vulnerabilities. With this in mind, a QKD proponent’s claims should be 
analyzed carefully. The events that will influence the adoption of QKD are major points 
to be set. We summarize them as follows: 
1. The event where current used cryptographic technics are considered 
ineffective and not secure enough. 
2. The event where advances in mathematical techniques constitute a threat to 
currently used cryptographic techniques. This advancement mainly can 
address the speed of factoring large numbers. 
3. The event where a fully functional quantum computer is practical and 
available for use. 
Cryptographic techniques cannot be absolutely secure; this is the case with QKD 
as well. But QKD may be the way to provide the highest level of security. The main 
purpose of this dissertation is to provide a quantum level of security while efficiently 
addressing a few problems that current QKD protocols have. This is addressed in the next 
chapters; however, one can note that this dissertation also addresses the problem of the 
need of sifting, public channel, and the need of single photon pulses. All of these in turn 
affect the distances and data rates of the quantum transmission. 
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III. Quantum Networks     
 
In its innate nature, QKD is a point-to-point key distribution technique. However, 
only a tiny fraction of all communication uses dedicated channels to insure safe 
information transfer. Most of the communication relies on networks where multiply 
interconnected users can operate and exchange information using a multitude of 
techniques and algorithms. In addition, the discussion of the disadvantages of QKD in 
Chapters 1 and 2 did shed light on a very important problem; that is the problem of the 
relatively short communication distance achieved by QKD.  QKD implementations have 
what we call a “quadratic curse” [59], where a signal undergoes steep  attenuation at a 
critical distance before totally disappearing as shown in Figure 3. 
 
Figure 3:Point-to-point QKD link performance. Source:[60] 
 
To be suitable for practical communication, QKD links should be part of an 
overall network. This solution will alleviate the point-to-point nature of QKD and 
improve the distance of the key transfer by having a cascaded nodes scheme. The design 
of such a network should take into consideration having enough redundancy to cope with 
single or multiple link failure while insuring any two nodes in the network can exchange 
keys with unconditional security. QKD networks where each link inhibits the same 
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unconditional level of security is the only way proponents of QKD can thrust aside the 
claims of their opponents described in Section II.viii. Currently, increased research has 
been devoted to design and implementing various QKD networks. Quantum networks are 
described through the rest of this section. 
Quantum networks can be divided into three main types: quantum node networks, 
optical node networks, and trusted relay networks. Each of them has strengths and 
weaknesses; they are  described in detail in [61].  
i. Quantum Node Networks  
 
Quantum nodes are used to combat the process of decoherence [62]. This 
phenomenon is typically the reason behind the degradation of the signal over a quantum 
channel. Since decoherence is a quantum phenomenon, it can only be fixed by using 
nodes which can perform active transformations on quantum signals. Such nodes are 
called quantum nodes; they all rely on entanglement. As explained in [63], a network 
consisting  of quantum memories where each of them stores a share of  multipartite 
entangled states can be used for quantum cryptography. According to them, the challenge 
of quantum nodes is in the distribution entangled states over long distances. The most 
elaborate quantum nodes proposed so far are quantum repeaters [64]. The authors of [64] 
use entangled photon sources along with quantum memories and purification of 
entanglement in order to achieve perfect entangled quantum states. These states are stored 
in nodes over quantum channel links. These links are chained using entanglement 
swapping.  
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ii. Optical Node Networks  
 
Optical QKD nodes use classical optical processes on a quantum signal such as: 
beam splitting, multiplexing, de-multiplexing, switching, etc. These optical networking 
functionalities allow the creation of one to many QKD links. In other words, it permits 
going beyond 2-user QKD. One-to-many connectivity between four QKD devices is 
presented in [65] . With active optical switching, selective connection of any two QKD 
nodes with a direct quantum channel is allowed. The BBN DARPA quantum network 
[66, 67] is the first network to use the multi-user QKD feature. It has been deployed 
between Boston University, Harvard, and BBN. The optical nodes used in this type of 
network do not need to be trusted, since quantum signals are transmitted over a quantum 
channel with no disruption. An optical node QKD network model cannot be used as a 
way to extend the distance of key distribution. Undeniably, the extra optical losses 
introduced in the nodes will actually reduce the maximum length of quantum channels. 
iii. Trusted Relay Networks 
The QKD network types described above both have major disadvantages. 
Quantum node networks have the promise of increasing the distance; however, they are 
only achievable theoretically. On the other hand, the optical node networks are practically 
possible but they have an adverse effect on the maximum achievable distance. Trusted 
relay networks is the third type and it is somewhere in between the two types. Trusted 
relays use classical technology but a relay node is trusted implicitly to forward the 
quantum signal without tampering or eavesdropping. 
Trusted relay QKD networks follow the following principle: local keys are 
generated over QKD links and then stored in nodes at both ends of each link. Global key 
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distribution is performed over a QKD path.  One chain of trusted relays is connected by 
QKD links, as shown in Figure 4, to establish a connection between two end nodes. Hop-
by-hop fashion along QKD paths is used to distribute secret keys. End-to-end security is 
guaranteed between the end nodes, given that the nodes in the middle can be trusted. 
Trusted relay networks can be used to build a long-distance QKD network. 
 
Figure 4:Hop by Hop QKD path. Source:[59] 
 
IV. Practical QKD Networks Implementation 
 
This section aims at describing a couple of QKD network implementations. The 
first implementation is that of BBN DARPA QKD network and the second is that of 
SECOQC network.  
i. BBN DARPA QKD Network 
 
As discussed earlier, the limitations associated with QKD can be mitigated by 
forming QKD networks to replace stand-alone QKD nodes. Therefore, a team from BBN 
Technologies, Boston University, and Harvard University built and operated the first 
QKD network under the sponsorship of the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA) [68]. This network is referred to as DARPA Quantum Network; it became fully 
operational on October 23, 2003 in BBN’s laboratories, and in June 2004 it was fielded 
through dark fiber under the roads of Cambridge, Massachusetts. It is the first metro-area 
QKD network in continuous operation. 
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As of December 2004, DARPA QKD network constituted of six QKD nodes. 
Four of these nodes are used at BBN and are weak-coherent QKD systems operating at 
5-MHz pulse rate and are inter-connected using a photonic switch. The other two are built 
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST). 
 
Figure 5: Metro-Fiber DARPA Quantum Network. Source: [68] 
 
The span of the DARPA QKD network is shown in Figure 5 (as of December 2004). 
Figure 6 shows the connectivity schematic of the network. Alice and Anna are two weak-
coherent BB84 transmitters. Bob and Boris are two receivers; along with a 2×2 switch 
they can couple any transmitter to any receiver. Alice, Bob, and the switch reside at 
BBN’s laboratories, whereas Boris is in Boston University and Anna is at Harvard.  
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Figure 6: Connectivity schematic of the DARPA QKD network. Source:[68] 
 
The part spanning from Harvard to BBN is around 10 Km long. The part from Boston 
University to BBN is almost 19 Km. This gives a total of 29 Km QKD distance from 
Harvard to Boston University. The network uses SMF-28 telecommunication fiber, with 
an average number of photons from Anna of 0.5 and an average of 1 at Boris. Anna-Bob 
link delivers about 1000 secret bits/second with an average QBER of 3%.  
 The network also contains Ali and Baba running the BBN QKD system protocols 
linked to the overall network by key relay between Alice and Ali. Furthermore, the 
network contains two other nodes that are entanglement based. These links are Alex and 
Barb and they are built jointly by Boston University and BBN. 
ii. SECOQC  
The SECOQC network is formed of two types of nodes: 
 Access Nodes or QAN: These nodes are essentially a point-to-point link 
from an end user into the backbone of the quantum network. 
 Backbone Nodes or QBB: These nodes are more complex and are in the 
form of building blocks where each four of them are connected via six 
quantum channels. 
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 The implementation strategy of the SECOQC is to use different types of QKD 
equipment to maximize the effectiveness of the experiment. The specific performance 
objective is to establish a QKD link that spans over 25 Km and operates at a rate higher 
than 1 Kbit/sec. 
 
Figure 7: Stations SIE, ERD, GUD, and BREIT. Source:[59] 
 
Figure 7 shows the geographical span of the network. Six nodes are connected via 
eight QKD links. BREIT, SIE, ERD, FRM and GUD are located in various premises 
belonging to Siemens and use Siemens’ internal fiber optic communications ring. 
Another node (STP) is a repeater station near St Polten. 
Figure 8: Connectivity schematic of SECOQC ring via Vienna.  Source: [59] 
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Figure 8 shows the network topology of the SECOQC QKD. (Solid lines 
represent quantum communication channels; dotted lines denote classical 
communication channels). Various QKD technologies are used:  
 STP – BRT use a Coherent One-Way protocol (COW)  
 BRT – GUD, BRT – ERD and SIE – GUD use Plug and Play, which use BB84 
and SARG04 (BRT – ERD)  
 BRT- SIE use a Toshiba system via Weak Coherent Pulses plus decoy states in 
BB84  
 ERD – FRM use a free space Quantum optical link, via BB84 and decoy states  
 SIE – ERD use an entanglement based scheme, in the BBM92 protocol  
 GUD – ERD employed a CV system 
The results are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2: Key rate generation for SECOQC links. Source:[59] 
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V. Conclusion 
The chapter was divided into three main topics. First, this chapter discussed the 
details of a few QKD distribution protocols. Beginning with the BB84 protocol, this 
chapter presented a detailed description of its principle of operation. A description was 
given of how a quantum key is generated and exchanged between two communicating 
parties and the use of this protocol was provided. In addition, this chapter presented two 
variants of the BB84 protocol. The first one was the B92 protocol; it was shown that the 
only difference lies in the number of states used to distribute the raw key. The second one 
was the SARG04 protocol; here the only difference lies in the key sifting process. Both 
of the discussed variants have advantages and disadvantages compared to the original 
BB84 protocol. 
Second, this chapter discussed the disadvantages associated with the QKD 
protocols. The disadvantages are: vulnerability to denial of service attack, problems of 
realization of single photon sources and detectors,  losses a quantum signal undergoes 
over the quantum channel,  unrealistic assumptions in the current security proofs,  need 
for classical authentication, vulnerability to side channel attacks,   need for proper key 
management, and  need for QKD based crypto-systems.  
Third, this chapter addressed the topic of QKD networks. QKD networks are 
considered as the way to make suitable use of the QKD technology and a way to the make 
use of it on a large scale basis. Three different types of QKD networks were presented: 
Quantum nodes network, Optical nodes networks, and trusted relays networks. 
Furthermore, this chapter discussed the actual realization of two quantum networks: the 
BBN DARPA QKD network as well as the SECOQC network.  
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Chapter 3: Multi-Stage Protocols Using Polarization Hopping 
Securing information in transit is an increasingly important need of modern 
society. As discussed in the previous chapters, given sufficient computational power, all 
cryptography techniques in commercial use today can be rendered ineffective. This has 
led to quantum cryptography which is the only known mechanism to provide 
unconditional security.  
BB84 and its variants [16, 69-72]  are deployed for quantum key exchange and 
based on single photon implementations which have their own set of drawbacks. These 
drawbacks were discussed in detail in Chapters 1 and 2. We mention the fact that current 
contemporary QKD implementations rely on weak optical beams that produce much less 
than one photon per time slot on average. Therefore, most time slots will be empty; a few 
would have single photons and very few more than a single photon.   The BB84 
configuration thus limits the distance, the speed, and the security of quantum 
communication.  
Currently, attention is being directed into establishing quantum secure protocols 
that use multiple photons in order to overcome the limitations associated with single 
photon approaches [73, 74]. This chapter proposes a multi-stage protocol related to the 
three-stage protocol initially introduced in 2006 [11, 75, 76]. This chapter generalizes the 
three-stage protocol to an 𝑚 -stage protocol where 𝑚 defines the number of stages in the 
protocol. The multi-stage protocol is based on the usage of unitary transformations known 
only to Alice and Bob, individually. Alice and Bob need not communicate information 
about the transformations they use to anyone, even to each other. The only condition on 
these transformations is being commutative. In the following, the encoding of the 
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information bits and the transformation operations are taken to be performed in the 
polarizations of the photons. 
In this chapter, a modified version of the multi-stage protocol is proposed in order 
to counteract the man-in-the middle attack [77]. The proposed version adds one more 
dimension to the multi-stage protocol, where the number of variables used is equal or 
larger than  𝑚 + 1, 𝑚 being the number of stages. This modification is called a 
key/message expansion multi-stage protocol where an initial random string of bits known 
to both Alice and Bob is used in order fully to secure the next message to be transferred. 
I. The Multi-stage Protocol Polarization Hopping 
This section presents the multi-stage protocol as a quantum secure protocol that 
makes use of linearly polarized light to encode classical bits of information to be shared. 
During the execution of a multi-stage protocol with an odd number of stages, one of the 
communicating parties (Alice) starts the communication by encoding the data to be sent 
into one of two orthogonal states, then applies its unitary transformation and sends it to 
Bob. Bob applies his own unitary transformation and sends the resulting state back to 
Alice. Alice now removes the first unitary transformation she applied and applies a new 
unitary transformation before sending it back to Bob who will repeat the process. This 
process will be executed in the same way until the last stage of the protocol where Alice 
will remove all the transformations she made and return the data, with only Bob’s 
transformations back to  Bob. Since Bob knows exactly the transformations he made to 
the encoded data, he removes his transformations and recovers the data.   
In case 𝑚 is even, the communication will start at the receiver (Bob). He starts 
the communication using a random polarization state representing his first unitary 
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transformation. He sends this polarization state to Alice who in turn encodes the 
information to be shared and applies her transformation. The communication will proceed 
in this manner as in the case where 𝑚 is odd but with Bob being the entity who decodes 
the information at the last stage. In the cases where m = 1, 2 are special cases. For security 
purposes, the use of the key/message expansion protocol proposed later in this chapter is 
required.  
As explained above, the encoded polarization states of the information to be 
transferred are never sent directly on the channel. At each stage of transmission, a unitary 
transformation is applied in order to change the state of the polarization sent over the 
channel. The unitary transformation applied is only known to the party applying it.  
Polarization hopping is the process of changing the polarization state at each stage of the 
protocol. The message transfer always starts by encoding a bit of information in a 
polarization state; for example, bit 0 is encoded using state |0⟩ and bit 1 is encoded using 
state |1⟩, whereas on the channel the state of polarization is given by 𝛼|0⟩ + 𝛽|1⟩. A 
transformation applied by one communicating party at a given stage will result in new 
values of 𝛼 and 𝛽. Note that in the following we will restrict to the case with real 𝛼 and 𝛽, 
i.e., the polarization stays on the equator of the Poincare sphere. 
We designate the polarization state as a value of a linear polarization angle, e.g., 
0 is bit 0 and 
𝜋
2
 is bit 1. When the transfer is initiated on Alice’s side, she performs her 
unitary transformation by changing the value of the polarization angle and sends it to 
Bob, who in turn will do the same. The next steps of the protocol will be carried out the 
same way until the last stage where Alice removes her transformations and sends them to 
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Bob who in turn removes his transformations and recovers the original state. While in 
transit, the value of the polarization angle will be in  the following form: 
𝜙𝑖 = {
0° +
𝑏𝑖𝜋
𝑀
+
𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑀
,            encoded angle is 0°
90° +
𝑏𝑖𝜋
𝑀
+
𝑎𝑖𝜋
𝑀
,          encoded angle is 90°
 
where 𝑏𝑖 denotes Bob’s transformation and 𝑎𝑖 denotes Alice’s transformation in the ith 
stage with 𝑎𝑖, 𝑏𝑖 ∈ {0, 1, ⋯ , 𝑀 − 1}. The total number of angles that can be used over the 
channel is𝑀, which is derived by dividing the full polarization circle into 2𝑀 equal parts. 
Alice’s and Bob’s transformations are multiples of  
𝜋
𝑀
 changes to the polarization angle. 
We wish to have 𝑀 as large as possible for a higher degree of security, with the ideal 
limit 𝑀 → ∞. Figure 9 represents one example of the extraction of possible polarization 
angles.  
0°
90°
Polarization angle used 
over the channel
 
Figure 9: Representation of the choices of encoding angles and the angles used over the 
channel for 𝟐𝑴 = 𝟑𝟐 
 
The advantage that the intended receiver has over an intruder is that while the 
intruder has to distinguish between one of the M polarization angles, the receiver only 
needs to distinguish between two orthogonal polarization angles. While the receiver 
would need only one photon to do so, the intruder Eve would need 𝑁 photons per leg. 
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When Eve attempts to measure 𝜙𝑖 she will be confronted with quantum noise; this is 
addressed in detail in Chapter 4. 
Throughout this chapter, we use the multi-stage protocol with 𝑚 = 3 stages. 
However, the discussion can be generalized to any value of m. It is important to note that 
the multi-stage protocols fall into two categories.  The first category is the case when 𝑚 <
3. In this case, the protocol needs an initialization vector to be shared before the onset of 
the transmission and thus can only be used as a key/message expansion protocol 
(discussed in section V for𝑚 = 3). The second category is when𝑚 ≥ 3. In this case, the 
protocol can be used for direct quantum communication or can be used as a key/message 
expansion protocol. It is important to note that an increased number of stages 𝑚 means 
that an eavesdropper is faced with the problem of measuring the states of polarization of 
more stages .In addition, using more stages means that the sender can use more photons 
per pulse to encode each bit of information, 𝑚𝑁 photons. However, an increase in the 
number of stages poses an overhead on the sender and the receiver with an increase of 
the losses that the beam of light will experience. As stated previously, when 𝑚 is odd, the 
communication begins at Alice’s side and ends at Bob’s side and when 𝑚  is even, the 
communication begins and ends both at Bob.  
II. The Three-stage Protocol 
i. Operation 
The three-stage protocol shown in Figure 10 was first proposed in [75], and 
implemented as a multi-photon tolerant protocol in [11]. It is an alternative to the BB84 
protocol which is the most widely used QKD protocol.  
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The mode of operation of the three-stage protocol can be described as follows: a 
sender, Alice, wants to convey a message 𝑋 to a receiver, Bob. Alice can encode each bit 
of her message using orthogonal polarization angles; she can encode bit 0 with 0° 
polarization and bit 1 with 
𝜋
2
 polarization. In order to secure the information transfer over 
the channel, Alice and Bob apply secret unitary transformations 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐵 respectively. 
These transformation should commute, i.e., 𝑈𝐴𝑈𝐵=𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐴. The steps of the three-stage 
protocol are as follows: 
Step 1: Alice applies a unitary transformation 𝑈𝐴 on the quantum information 𝑋 and sends 
the qubits to Bob.  
Step 2: Bob applies 𝑈𝐵(𝑋) on the received photons 𝑈𝐴(𝑋), giving 𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐴(𝑋) and sends 
them back to Alice. As mentioned above 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐵 should be commutative 
transformations.  
Step 3: Alice applies 𝑈𝐴
†
 (transpose complex conjugate of 𝑈𝐴) on the received photons 
to get 𝑈𝐴
†𝑈𝐵𝑈𝐴(𝑋)  =  𝑈𝐵(𝑋) and sends them back to Bob.  
Step 4: Then Bob applies 𝑈𝐵
†
 on 𝑈𝐵(𝑋) to get the information  𝑋. 
The operation of the three-stage protocol is shown in Figure 10. 
  
ALICE
ALICE
BOB
BOB
 
Figure 10: Three-stage protocol operation 
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ii. Implementation of the Protocol 
 
The first implementation of the three-stage protocol depicted in Figure 11 was 
reported in [11, 76, 78]. The implementation of the protocol is divided into three main 
stages: encoding, polarization transformation or key application , and decoding. At the 
first stage, each bit of the message is encoded using one of two orthogonal polarization 
angles; bit 0 is encoded with 0° polarization and bit 1 is encoded with 
𝜋
2
 polarization.  At 
this stage an optical beam polarized at 
𝜋
4
 is directed into a polarizing beam splitter (beam 
splitter 1), where it will be divided into two equal intensity beams. Now the bits are 
encoded using LabView programmed shutters. Shutters are programmed in a way such 
that shutter 1 will open when bit 1 is to be sent; the optical beam will then pass through a 
𝜋
2
 polarizer (pol-1). On the other hand, if bit 0 is to be sent, shutter 2 will open and the 
optical beam will pass through a 0° polarizer (pol-2). After encoding each bit with the 
respective polarization, the optical beam will be redirected using a mirror (mirror 1 in the 
first path and mirror 2 in the second path) and a combiner. 
During the second stage the transformations 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐵 are applied using half 
wave plates. Alice will have two half wave plates mounted on rotators controlled by a 
computer. Half wave plate 1 (HWP-1) will be rotated to a random angle 𝜃𝐴 (angle of the 
fast axis) chosen by Alice and known only to her; meanwhile half wave plate 2 (HWP-2 
) will be rotated to an angle−𝜃𝐴. At Bob’s side two half wave plates are fixed at opposite 
angle 𝜃𝐵 and  −𝜃𝐵 (HWP-3 and HWP-4 respectively). It is important to note that the half 
wave plates at Bob’s side are also mounted on rotators and the value of 𝜃𝐵 can be 
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randomly chosen and known only to Bob.  The formalism of how the angles of the fast 
axis are chosen is discussed in the next section using the Mueller matrices. 
In the last stage of this implementation, the decoding stage, the optical beam is 
passed through a polarization beam splitter. The horizontal polarization component of the 
optical beam will pass the beam splitter while the vertical component is reflected. 
Decoding is done according to the light intensity received at the detectors D1 and D2. 
It is worth noting that the implementation presented in this section is a laboratory 
proof of concept of an implementation of a multi-stage protocol with 𝑚 = 3. The data 
rates achieved are of the order of a few bits per second due to the fact that the 
implementation uses mechanically driven hardware to encode and effect the polarization 
rotations. The distance at which the implementation was done is 30cm.   
 
Figure 11: Implementation of the three-stage protocol 
 
47 
 
iii. Rotation Transformations: 
 
In this section the setup of the unitary transformations applied using half wave 
plates is discussed along with the choice of the rotation angle (𝜃) of the half wave plates 
with respect to the horizontal axis. This choice is based on the Mueller matrix formalism 
to ensure that a polarization angle input to the setup of the half wave plate is equal to that 
at the output of the setup. 
Half Wave Plate Operation 
A half wave plate produces a polarization shift of 180° between the fast and slow 
axes of a wave plate [79]. The Mueller matrix of a half wave plate is given by: 
 
MHWP = [
1 0 0 0
0 1 0 0
0 0 −1 0
0 0 0 −1
]. 
 
The implementation described in the previous section uses rotating half wave plates. The 
Mueller matrix of a rotating half wave plate with an angle θ with respect to the horizontal 
direction is given by [79]: 
 
M(𝜃)HWP = MROT(−𝜃) ⋅ MHWP ⋅ MROT(𝜃), 
 
where MROT(𝜃) is the Mueller matrix for rotation and is given by: 
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MROT(𝜃) = [
1 0 0 0
0 cos(2𝜃) sin(2𝜃) 0
0 − sin(2𝜃) cos(2𝜃) 0
0 0 0 1
]. 
Then the Mueller matrix of a rotating half wave plate is given by: 
 
 MHWP(𝜃) = [
1 0 0 0
0 cos (4𝜃) sin (4𝜃) 0
0 sin (4𝜃) −cos (4𝜃) 0
0 0 0 −1
]. 
Choice of the Rotation Angle  
It is important to note that the requirement imposed on the transformations used 
in the three-stage protocol is to be commutative while being only known to the entity 
applying them. In the case where only the setup of Alice’s half wave plates are 
considered, one can see that when Alice applies a transformation MHWP(𝜃𝐴) using her 
first half wave plate (HWP-1 in Figure 11), she should apply MHWP(𝜃𝐴) using her second 
half wave plate (HWP-3 in Figure 11) in order to remove the effect of her first 
transformation on the input polarization angle. It can be observed that 
MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) = I,             (1) 
where I is the identity matrix. 
However, once the half wave plates of Bob are considered, one can see that the 
polarization of the input beam is not equal to the polarization of the output beam even if 
the same angles are used, viz., 
 
MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ≠ I.              (2) 
 
This is due to the fact that the operation of the half wave plates is not commutative, i.e., 
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MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ≠ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐵).             (3) 
 
One can note from the Mueller matrix representation of half wave plates that  
 
MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) = MHWP(−𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(−𝜃𝐵).             (4) 
Thus, 
MHWP(−𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(−𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) = MHWP(−𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(−𝜃𝐵) ⋅
MHWP(𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴) = I,             (5) 
 
where 0 < 𝜃𝐴 < 𝜋 and 0 < 𝜃𝐵 < 𝜋. 
Equation (5) shows the choice of the angles that will insure that the 
transformations used by Alice and Bob commute without the need of sharing any 
information about the actual angles. Therefore, we choose the angles of the 
transformation in such a way that in case Alice applies MHWP(𝜃𝐴) first she will apply 
MHWP(−𝜃𝐴) in order to cancel her transformation and Bob does the same as well using 
his own randomly chosen angles.  
III. Key/Message Expansion Multi-stage Protocol 
In this section a key/message expansion algorithm using a multi-stage protocol is 
proposed. We call a key expansion algorithm a key distribution method that requires 
having a shared initialization vector at the onset of the communication. In the meanwhile, 
we call a message expansion algorithm a message sharing scheme that requires having a 
shared initialization vector at the onset of the communication. The initialization vector 
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used is updated using the message or the key shared in the case of message expansion or 
key expansion respectively.   
i. Multi-stage Protocol Using an Initialization Vector 
 
In this section we present the multi-stage protocol using 𝑚 + 1 variables. It is well 
known that it is impossible to obtain a unique solution for an undetermined system. In 
this approach we make sure our system satisfies this fact by adding the requirement of an 
initialization vector to any version of the multi-stage protocol. We call 𝐼𝑉 the 
initialization vector shared between the sender and receiver at the onset of the 
communication. The initialization vector 𝐼𝑉 along with the message/key shared will be 
used in order to create a new 𝐼𝑉 to be used during the next communication.  
In the next section we discuss the four-variable three-stage protocol. It should be 
noted that the same logic is followed to generalize the proposed approach for different 
values of 𝑚. As mentioned earlier, if 𝑚 is even the communication would start and end 
at the receiver’s end. Whereas, if 𝑚 is odd the communication starts at the sender and 
ends at the receiver.  
ii. Operation of the Four-variables Three-stage Protocol 
 
In this chapter we propose an implementation of a  the key/message expansion 
four-variable three-stage protocol reported in [77]. The four-variable three-stage protocol 
adds one more dimension to the three-stage protocol to enhance its security while keeping 
its mode of operation intact. The dimension added is presented as an initialization 
vector 𝐼𝑉 that Alice and Bob are assumed to possess at the beginning of the first iteration 
of the protocol. The initialization vector 𝐼𝑉 is a string of unitary transformations; we call 
51 
 
a cycle of the protocol a complete execution of the three-stage protocol that results in one 
bit shared between Alice and Bob. It is important to note that the number of cycles per 
iteration is equal to the length of the string 𝐼𝑉. The initialization vector 𝐼𝑉 is updated to 
a new value at the end of eachiteration using the message shared between Alice and Bob 
as well as the initialization vector used in the last iteration. This can be observed as 
chaining between iterations of the protocol implementation. One can use any non-linear 
function to relate between 𝐼𝑉0 and 𝑋0 and generate the new value 𝐼𝑉1. The operation of 
the four-variable three-stage protocol is discussed below and depicted in Figure 12.  
 
Figure 12: Operation of the three-stage protocol using four variables 
 
We call 𝐼𝑉0[𝑛] the initialization vector at iteration 0 cycle number n; 𝑋0[𝑛] is the 
bit value of the message being transferred, and α0[n] and β0[n] are the values of the 
unitary transformations at iteration 0 cycle number n of Alice and Bob respectively.  
Step 1: Alice applies a unitary transformation 𝛼0[𝑛] on the on IV0[n] and sends the optical 
beam to Bob. 
Step 2: Bob applies 𝛽0[n]  on the received optical beam and sends it back to Alice. 
Step 3: Alice applies 𝛼0
†[𝑛] (transpose complex conjugate of 𝛼0[𝑛]) on the received qubit 
to get and then encodes the value of X0[n] and sends it to Bob. 
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Step 4: Then Bob applies 𝐼𝑉0
†
[n] (transpose complex conjugate of IV0[n]) then applies 
𝛽0
†[𝑛] and gets the information 𝑋0[𝑛]. 
At the next cycle Alice will use a new transformation set 𝛼0[𝑛 + 1] and Bob 
should use 𝛽0[𝑛 + 1]  and a next value in the string of the initialization vector 𝐼𝑉0[𝑛 + 1] 
will be used. When the number of cycles is equal to the length of 𝐼𝑉, a new 𝐼𝑉1 of the 
same length as 𝐼𝑉0 will be generated. It should be noted that Alice and Bob do not have 
any restrictions on the transformations associated with 𝐼𝑉, and it does not need to 
commute with 𝛼 and 𝛽. Furthermore, the updated initialization vector will be in the binary 
form of 0’s and 1’s. Alice and Bob can associate these bits with variable transformation 
values depending on a prior agreement.  
Adding an extra dimension to the three-stage protocol makes it possible to 
consider it as a one-time pad since at each stage of the protocol one new variable is added 
in order to secure the outcome of the previous stage. An eavesdropper having 
simultaneous access to the three stages of the protocol will not be able to compute the 
value of the sent bit, since he/she will be faced with the problem of solving an 
undetermined system of equations. In addition, such an approach makes it impossible to 
launch a man-in-the-middle attack.  
The addition of an initialization vector to the three-stage protocol can be regarded 
as a door function to protect the message sent over the channel. Any illegitimate user is 
denied from the ability of retrieving the value of the bit sent over the channel as long as 
he/she does not have in his/her possession the key for the door function, with the angle 𝜃 
at which the half wave plate in the next section is set.    
 
53 
 
iii. Implementation of the Four-variables Three-stage Protocol 
 
In this section we discuss the implementation of a four-variable three-stage 
protocol over free-space optics (FSO) using passive optical components. The setup of the 
implementation is depicted in Figure 13. The setup proposed is as follows: Alice will 
have four half wave plates in her possession meanwhile Bob has only three half wave 
plates. At the beginning of the protocol Alice generates a state with a 0° linear polarization 
using a 0° polarizer. Then she will apply a transformation 𝐼𝑉[𝑛] using a half wave plate 
(HWP-1) set at an angle 𝜃 and the unitary transformation 𝛼[𝑛] using her second half 
wave(HWP-2) plate at an angle 𝜃𝐴. Then she will send the optical beam to Bob. Bob will 
apply his unitary transformation 𝛽[𝑛] using his first half wave plate (HWP-3) at an angle 
𝜃𝐵 and send the optical beam to Alice using mirror 1. Alice will remove her 
transformation by setting her third half wave plate (HWP-4) at the angle 𝛼[𝑛] = −𝜃𝐴. 
Then she will apply the transformation associated with the encoded bit using her fourth 
half wave plate (HWP-5) that will be set at angle 𝜃𝑥 = 0° in the case of bit 0 is being sent 
and 𝜃𝑥 = 45° if bit 1 is being sent. Now Alice will send the optical beam containing the 
message to Bob who will first pass it through a half wave plate (HWP-6) at angle 𝜃 to 
remove the transformation induced by the initialization vector. Then he will remove his 
transformation using a half wave plate (HWP-7) set at the angle −𝜃𝐵. At this stage Bob 
will have a beam polarized at either 0° or 90°. He will pass it through a polarization beam 
splitter to detect whether bit 0 or 1 has been received.  
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Figure 13: Implementation of the four variables three-stage protocol 
 
The choice of the angles for the setup described above is made according to the 
same formalism described in section II. iii of  Chapter 2. For the implementation of the 
four-variable three-stage protocol we can write the Mueller matrices of the half wave 
plates operation as follows: 
MHWP(−𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝑥) ⋅ MHWP(−𝜃𝐴) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐵) ⋅ MHWP(𝜃𝐴)
⋅ MHWP(𝜃) = MHWP(𝜃𝑥). 
Since the input state is a 0° polarized state it can be represented using the Stokes 
parameters: 
Sin = [
1
1
0
0
]. 
Thus the Stokes parameters of the output of the proposed setup are given by: 
 
Sout = MHWP(𝜃𝑥) ⋅ Sin.            (14) 
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This means that in the case 𝜃𝑥 = 0°, the output light will be horizontally polarized; 
otherwise if 𝜃𝑥 =
𝜋
4
 , the output light will be vertically polarized. 
IV. Conclusion  
This chapter has proposed a generalized multi-stage multi-photon tolerant 
protocol for quantum secure communication. The security of the multi-stage protocol is 
based on the fact that while a legitimate receiver only needs to distinguish between two 
orthogonal polarization states, an intruder has to distinguish among an infinite number of 
possible polarization states. In other words, while the receiver would need only one 
photon to do so, an intruder would need to siphon off a minimum number 𝑁 of photons 
per stage. This chapter has also proposed a key/message expansion scheme associated 
with the multi-stage protocol which has been proposed. The key/message expansion 
scheme provides a countermeasure to any man-in-the-middle attack that can be launched 
on the system. The proposed multi-stage multi-photon protocol provides higher data rates 
as well as longer communication distances compared to its single-photon counterparts. In 
addition, in this chapter an implementation of the generalized multi-stage multi-photon 
tolerant protocol as well as its key/message expansion scheme has been proposed. These 
implementations have been done in a laboratory setup using passive optical components. 
In this chapter, the theory behind the use of half wave plates in this implementation has 
been explained in detail based on the Mueller matrices formalism.  
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Chapter 4: Preliminary Security Analysis of the Multi-stage 
Protocol 
 
A generalized multi-stage, multi-photon tolerant protocol was proposed in 
Chapter 3. Multi-stage protocols use arbitrary polarization states to communicate data 
securely between a sender and a receiver. It is well known that since the polarization 
measurement of an arbitrarily unknown polarized state results in altering the state in an 
irreversible way, any such measurement produces noise in the measured state. The 
proposed multi-stage protocol exploits this phenomenon to provide quantum secure 
communication.  This chapter assesses the vulnerability of the multi-stage protocol to a 
photon number splitting attack and a Trojan horse attack.  
In addition, this chapter presents two approaches to calculating an upper bound 
on the average number of photons that can be used per pulse to exchange information 
while maintaining quantum-level security. The first approach is through the assumption 
that an eavesdropper is faced with the problem of discriminating between two 
polarization states. This results in an inaccurate state estimation. The second approach is 
through the assumption that a certain amount of noise will be introduced to the 
measurement of the state in each stage. The noise introduced may result in an 
undetermined value of the measured bit, or a flip in the value of the bit. The assumption 
we make through the second approach is that Alice and Bob are using Fock states.    
Determination of an upper bound on the number of photons is an extremely 
important task for the multi-stage protocol. It allows the multi-stage protocol to operate 
in the multi-photon domain while maintaining quantum-level security. It is shown that 
the average number of photons that can be used per stage of a multi-stage protocol is 
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larger than that of its single photon counterpart. In the latter case, in BB84 and its decoy 
state version an average of less than 0.5 photons per pulse is used [32, 80-85]. Increasing 
the average number of photons will result in a better performance of the QC protocols, as 
shown in Chapter 6. 
I. Background Knowledge  
i. Helstrom discrimination 
The Helstrom formula was derived in the mid-70s to describe the minimum error 
probability for the case where two quantum states are used [86]. These quantum states 
can be either pure or mixed states, and the error probability is denoted by 𝑃𝐸.  
This section summarizes the derivation of the probability of the correct state 
discrimination 𝑃𝐶  [87]. 𝑃𝐶 is used later in this chapter to compute the number of photons 
that Alice and Bob can use while achieving quantum secure communication. It is 
instructive to start by analyzing the two-state minimum-error measurement with the help 
of the method in [88, 89]. Starting from,  
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 1 − ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝑇𝑟(𝜌𝑗𝛱𝑗)
𝑚
𝑗=1     
 where 𝜂𝑗 and 𝛱𝑗 are the priori probabilities and detection operators respectively and 𝜌𝑗 
is the density operator of a given quantum system. They should satisfy the following 
relations 
𝜂1 + 𝜂2  = 1 and 𝛱1 + 𝛱2 =  𝐼𝐷𝑠 
Then, the probability of getting an erroneous result in the measurement is given by [87] 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 1 − ∑ 𝜂𝑗𝑇𝑟(𝜌𝑗𝛱𝑗)
2
𝑗=1
= 𝜂1𝑇𝑟(𝜌1𝛱2) + 𝜂2𝑇𝑟(𝜌2𝛱1) 
This can be alternatively expressed as 
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𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝜂1 + 𝑇𝑟(𝛬𝛱1) = 𝜂2 − 𝑇𝑟(𝛬𝛱2) 
where we introduced the Hermitian operator, 
𝛬 = 𝜂1𝜌1 + 𝜂2𝜌2 = ∑ 𝜆𝑘|∅𝑘⟩⟨∅𝑘|
𝐷𝑠
𝑘=1
 
Here the states |∅𝑘⟩ denote the orthonormal eigenstates belonging to the eigenvalues 𝜆𝑘 
of the operator 𝛬. By using the spectral decomposition of 𝛬, we get the representations: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟 = 𝜂1 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘⟨∅𝑘|𝛱1|∅𝑘⟩
𝐷𝑠
𝑘=1 = 𝜂2 + ∑ 𝜆𝑘⟨∅𝑘|𝛱2|∅𝑘⟩
𝐷𝑠
𝑘=1           (4.1) 
Now the optimization task consists of determining the specific operators 𝛱1 , or 𝛱2 , 
respectively, that minimize the right-hand side of (4.1) under the constraint that 
0 ≤ ⟨∅𝑘|𝛱𝑗|∅𝑘⟩ ≤ 1                    (𝑗 = 1,2) 
for all eigenstates |∅𝑘⟩ . The latter requirement is because 𝑇𝑟(𝜌𝛱𝑗) denotes a probability 
for any 𝜌. From this constraint and from (4.1), it follows that the smallest possible error 
probability, 𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑟
𝑚𝑖𝑛 = 𝑃𝐸 , can be achieved when the detection operators are selected in such 
a way ⟨∅𝑘|𝛱1|∅𝑘⟩ = 1 and ⟨∅𝑘|𝛱2|∅𝑘⟩ = 0 are fulfilled for eigenstates belonging to 
negative eigenvalues.  Meanwhile eigenstates corresponding to positive eigenvalues obey 
the equations ⟨∅𝑘|𝛱1|∅𝑘⟩ = 0 and ⟨∅𝑘|𝛱2|∅𝑘⟩ = 1. Thus, the optimum detection 
operators can be written as 
𝛱1 = ∑ |∅𝑘⟩⟨∅𝑘|
𝑘0−1
𝑘=1                          𝛱1 = ∑ |∅𝑘⟩⟨∅𝑘|
𝐷𝑠
𝑘=𝑘0
 
By inserting the optimum detection operators into  the minimum error probability is found 
to be [89]  
𝑃𝐸 = 𝜂1 − ∑ |𝜆𝑘|
𝑘0−1
𝑘=1 = 𝜂2 − ∑ |𝜆𝑘|
𝐷𝑠
𝑘0
              (4.2) 
Taking the sum of these two alternative representations and using 𝜂1 + 𝜂2 = 1, 𝑃𝐸 is 
represented by 
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𝑃𝐸 =
1
2
(1 − ∑ |𝜆𝑘|𝑘 ) = 
1
2
(1 − 𝑇𝑟(|𝛬|) 
where |𝛬| = √𝛬†𝛬 . Together with (4.1) this yields the well-known Helstrom formula 
[86] for the minimum error probability in discriminating 𝜌 1and 𝜌 2,  
𝑃𝐸 =
1
2
(1 − 𝑇𝑟|𝜂2 𝜌2 − 𝜂1 𝜌1|) 
In the special case that the states to be distinguished are the pure states |∅1⟩ and |∅2⟩, this 
expression reduces to [86]  
𝑃𝐸 =  
1
2
(1 − √1 − 4𝜂1 𝜂2 |⟨∅1|∅2⟩|2 
Giving rise to a probability of correct measurement given by 
𝑃𝐶 =
1
2
(1 + √1 − 4𝜂1 𝜂2 |⟨∅1|∅2⟩|2              (4.3) 
Equation (4.3) is used in Section II.i to derive the number of photons needed if Eve was 
to carry a PNS attack on the three-stage protocol. In this case we consider the capability 
of Eve to distinguish between two quantum states. It is worth noting that section II.i uses 
the condition 𝜂1 = 𝜂2 =
1
2
 that denotes the optimum discrimination strategy[87]. 
ii. Fock states  
In quantum mechanics, a Fock state or number state is a quantum state that is an 
element of a Fock space. A Fock state is a state with a well-defined number of particles. 
This type of state is named after the Soviet physicist Vladimir Fock. This section presents 
the derivations of the definition of the 𝑁th Fock state [90].  We start by considering the 
eigenvalue problem for ?̂? = ℎ𝜔 (?̂? +
1
2
). It is solved by considering the eigenvalue 
problem for the number operator since [?̂?, ?̂?] = 0. The eigenvalue equation reads 
?̂?|∅𝑁⟩ =𝑁|∅𝑁⟩ 
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where 𝑛 is the eigenvalue of ?̂? and |𝜓𝑁⟩ is the matching eigenvector. The number 
operator ?̂? = ?̂?⁺?̂? is a Hermitian operator; therefore its eigenvalues 𝑁 are real and its 
eigenvectors |∅𝑁⟩ form a complete set of orthogonal states. From the following 
⟨∅𝑁|?̂?|∅𝑁⟩ = ⟨∅𝑁|?̂?⁺?̂?|∅𝑁⟩ = 𝑁⟨∅𝑁|∅𝑁⟩ 
it can be seen that 𝑛 must be non-negative. This is due to the fact that |𝜓𝑁⟩ and ?̂?|𝜓𝑁⟩ are 
both Hilbert-space vectors with non-negative norms. Applying[?̂?, ?̂?+] = 1, it can be 
found that [?̂?, ?̂?] = [?̂?, ?̂?⁺?̂?] = ?̂?[?̂?, ?̂?⁺] = ?̂?; hereafter ?̂??̂?|∅𝑁⟩ = (?̂??̂? − [?̂?, ?̂?])|∅𝑁⟩ =
(𝑁 − 1)?̂?|∅𝑁⟩.This means ?̂?|∅𝑁⟩ is an eigenvector of the number operator with 
eigenvalue 𝑁 − 1 which it can be called |∅𝑁−1⟩. However, since all eigenvalues of ?̂? s 
are non-negative, a state |∅0⟩ with ?̂?|∅𝑁⟩ = 0 should be available. This state is referred 
to as the ground state. It contains no excitation, and thus cannot be further annihilated. 
Similarly, it can be found that 
?̂??̂?|∅𝑁⟩ = (𝑁 + 1)?̂?⁺|∅𝑁⟩ 
It can be seen that ?̂? and ?̂?⁺ lower and raise the number of excitations by one; hence their 
names, annihilation and creation operators. The action of ?̂? and ?̂?⁺ are shown in Figure 
14. 
 
Figure 14: The action of b ̂ and b ̂⁺ on a given Fock state 
 
Starting from the ground state |∅0⟩  all other states can be generated by successive 
application of the creation operator,  |∅𝑁⟩ = (?̂?⁺)
𝑁|∅0⟩. If we normalize these states 
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according to |∅𝑁⟩/⟨∅𝑁|∅𝑁⟩, we arrive at the definition of the number states or Fock 
states. If we assume that the ground state (or vacuum state) |0⟩ = |∅0⟩ is already 
normalized, then the 𝑁th Fock state is given by 
|∅𝑁⟩ = 𝑐𝑁(𝑏
†)𝑁|0⟩ 
where 𝑐𝑛 is the normalization constant given by  𝑐𝑁 =
1
√𝑁!
 . 
II. Photon Number Splitting Attack (PNS) 
A photon number splitting attack in the context of a multi-stage, multi-photon 
protocol would require an eavesdropper to siphon off a certain number of photons at each 
leg of the protocol in order to be able to recover the message sent over that leg (stage). In 
the case of the three-stage protocol, Eve would siphon off 𝑛 photons at each of the three 
legs. The PNS attack in the case of a three-stage protocol is shown in Figure 15. 
Furthermore, the angles of polarization at each stage of the protocol should be measured 
or estimated since the information from only one stage will not be sufficient to get the 
original encoded polarization angle.  
ALICE
ALICE
BOB
BOB
Eve filters out enough 
photons to do her 
measurement
Eve filters out enough 
photons to do her 
measurement
Eve filters out enough 
photons to do her 
measurement
X+α 
X+β 
 
Figure 15: Photon number splitting attack on the three-stage protocol 
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It is well known that as the number of photons in the optical beam increases, Eve’s 
ability to measure the polarization of the beam increases, and vice versa. In particular, 
this is due to the fact that the fidelity with which Eve can measure the state of polarization 
increases with the number of photons split from the beam. In other words, one can say 
that the three-stage protocol is theoretically secure as long as the number of photons in 
the beam launched by Alice is less than a certain threshold. We call this threshold 𝑁. So, 
in case y is the total number of photons in the beam, the security of the three-stage 
protocol is theoretically guaranteed as long as 𝑦 < 𝑁 [78].  
Assume that Eve successfully siphoned an equal number of photons off each of 
the three legs of the protocol. Knowing that a measurement of the value of the polarization 
angle would introduce noise, Eve will not be able to deduce the exact value of the 
incoming polarization state from the measured state of polarization. If the measurement 
on each leg introduces an equal amount of uncertainty to the actual angle of polarization 
sent over the channel, Eve will have in her possession, in the worst case scenario, 
𝜙 +3∆𝜙, where ∆𝜙 is the uncertainty added by the measurement on one leg. This logic 
can be applied to both the cases of state discrimination as well as Fock state measurement.     
Eve will have no precise information about 𝜙 in case [91]: 
3⟨∆𝜙⟩ ≥
𝜋
4
,       or     ⟨∆𝜙⟩ ≥
𝜋
12
  . 
i. Helstrom Discrimination  
 
 As the number of photons in a beam increases, the level of vulnerability of the 
protocol towards a PNS attack increases. In this section, we use the probability 𝑃𝐶 
calculated in section I.i in order to calculate the minimum average number of photons 
Eve needs to siphon off for her measurement. This number of photons per stage is the 
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maximum number per stage that should be used in the three-stage protocol to provide 
quantum secure communication. It is calculated in terms of the probability 𝑃𝐶 , in such a 
way that at each stage  ⟨∆𝜙⟩ ≥
𝜋
12
  is introduced giving rise to a total difference of more 
than or equal to 
𝜋
4
 between the original angle sent over the channel and the angle Eve has  
by the end of the protocol execution.        
 Figure 16 illustrates the interplay between the number of photons per stage in the 
beam and 𝑃𝐶. The three-stage protocol is unconditionally secure as long as the number of 
photons per stage used is less than depicted by the blue curve in Figure 16. We assume 𝑦 
is the actual number of photons per stage sent over the channel.  
 The interplay between the number of photons needed by Eve and 𝑀 can be derived 
using𝑃𝐶. We call 𝑀 the number of achievable polarization states at angle 
𝑘𝜋
𝑀
 with 𝑘 ∈
[0 … . 𝑁 − 1].  The possible states of 𝑦 photons can be written as follows [92] 
|𝜙𝑘⟩ = |𝑘, 𝑦⟩ = (
|0>+𝑒2𝑖𝑘𝜋 𝑀⁄ |1>
√2
)⊗𝑦            (4.4) 
The probability of confusing two different angles 𝑘 and 𝑘′is the scalar product given 
by: 
⟨𝑘′, 𝑦|𝑘, 𝑦⟩ = (cos ([𝑘 − 𝑘′]
𝜋
𝑀
))𝑦            (4.5) 
If the problem is restricted to discrimination between two angles 𝑘 and 𝑘 + 1 the 
probability of success of a Helstrom discrimination is given by [93] 
𝑃𝐶 =
1
2
[1 + √1 − |< 𝑘′, 𝑦|𝑘, 𝑦 > |2]            (4.6) 
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𝑃𝑐 ≥ 1 − 𝜖 where 𝜖 ≪ 1, thus 
(𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋
𝑀
)𝑦 ≤ 2√𝜖(1 − 𝜖) 
𝑦 ≥
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝜖+𝑙𝑜𝑔2+
1
2
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (1−𝜖)
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋
𝑀
)
            (4.7) 
When 𝑀 ≫ 1 we have 𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋
𝑀
≅ 1 −
1
2
(
𝜋
𝑀
)2 and therefore, 
𝑙𝑜𝑔 (𝑐𝑜𝑠
𝜋
𝑀
) ≅ −
𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑒
2
(
𝜋
𝑀
)2 
𝑦 ≥ 𝑀2
2
𝜋2
(−𝑙𝑛𝜖 − 𝑙𝑛2 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜖))             
In other words, this implies that the number of photons needed to discriminate between 
two polarization states is of the order 𝑀2. 
The calculations above are meant to distinguish between two states of a 
𝜋
𝑀
 
difference. In order to be applicable in the case of the three-stage protocol, the uncertainty 
introduced by the state discrimination used by should be equal to 
𝜋
12
  at least. Setting 𝑀 =
12 we get the following relation  
𝑦 ≥ 122
2
𝜋2
(−𝑙𝑛𝜖 − 𝑙𝑛2 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜖)) 
 Once again 𝑦 in this equation is the minimum number of photons needed by Eve and in 
the meanwhile it is the maximum number of photons that should be sent over the channel.  
This in turn means 
𝑦 < 122
2
𝜋2
(−𝑙𝑛𝜖 − 𝑙𝑛2 − 𝑙𝑛(1 − 𝜖))           (4.8) 
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Figure 16: Interplay between the number of photons needed by Eve and PC 
 
ii. Fock states         
 
In this section, the following calculations are used to find a generalized relation 
between ⟨∆𝜙⟩, the average angular deviation that a measurement done at Eve’s side has, 
and the minimum number of photons 𝑛 Eve needs for her measurement. We consider the 
case of Fock states or number states discussed  in section I.ii [94] to find the variance 
induced while measuring the polarization state using H-mode and V-mode. H-mode and 
V-mode represent measurements with respect to a horizontal or a vertical reference, 
respectively. 
66 
 
In our analysis, we represent our states as number states or Fock states. We assume 
that the vacuum state |∅0⟩ = |0⟩ is already normalized. Then the 𝑁
th Fock state is given 
by 
|∅𝑁⟩ = 𝑐𝑁(𝑏
†)𝑁|0⟩,   (4.9) 
where 𝑏† = cos 𝜙 𝑎𝐻
† + sin 𝜙 𝑎𝑉
†
 with 𝑎𝐻 and 𝑎𝑉 being the field operators for horizontal 
and vertical polarizations respectively, and the normalization constant 𝑐𝑁 = 1/√𝑁!. The 
binomial expansion of |∅𝑁⟩ is given by 
|∅𝑁⟩ = ∑ √
𝑁!
𝑘!(𝑁−𝑘)!
𝑁
𝑘=0 cos
k 𝜙 sin(𝑁−𝑘) 𝜙 |𝑘⟩𝐻|𝑁 − 𝑘⟩𝑉   (4.10) 
Since our decoding scheme is based on intensity detection, we derive Malus’ Law 
for our analysis. The average photon number in H-mode is given by the mean intensity 
distribution: 
⟨𝐼𝐻⟩ = ∑ 𝑘|⟨𝑘|∅⟩𝐻|
2∞
𝑘=0 = ∑ 𝑘 [
𝑁!
𝑘!(𝑁−𝑘)!
] (cos2 𝜙)𝑘(sin2 𝜙)𝑁−𝑘 = 𝑁 cos2 𝜙𝑁𝑘=0   (4.11) 
Similarly, ⟨𝐼𝑉⟩ =  𝑁 sin
2 𝜙. Then we find that the normalized intensities become 
𝐼𝐻
𝐼𝐻+𝐼𝑉
= cos2 𝜙,  (4.12) 
and 
𝐼𝑉
𝐼𝐻+𝐼𝑉
= sin2 𝜙.  (4.13) 
The variance in the intensity measurement in H-mode done by Eve can be found as 
follows: 
⟨𝐼𝐻
2⟩ − ⟨𝐼𝐻⟩
2 =
𝑁
4
sin2 2𝜙.  (4.14) 
Thus the normalized deviation of the H-mode is given by: 
√⟨𝐼𝐻
2 ⟩−⟨𝐼𝐻⟩
2
𝐼𝐻+𝐼𝑉
=
|sin 2𝜙|
2√𝑁
  (4.15) 
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It can be shown that the normalized deviation of the V-mode is identical to that of the 
H-mode. 
In order to find ⟨∆𝜙⟩ we take derivative of both sides of (4.15) as follows: 
Δ(cos2 𝜙) = Δ (
𝐼𝐻
𝐼𝐻 + 𝐼𝑉
) 
or        − sin(2𝜙)∆𝜙 =
∆𝐼𝐻
𝐼𝐻 + 𝐼𝑉
− 
𝐼𝐻
(𝐼𝐻 + 𝐼𝑉)2
(∆𝐼𝐻 + ∆𝐼𝑉) 
 
giving              ∆𝜙 =
cos (2𝜙)
2√𝑁
. 
We now find the average angular deviation that a measurement done at Eve’s side as 
⟨∆𝜙⟩ = |
⟨cos (2𝜃)⟩
2√𝑁
| 
Thus, ⟨∆𝜙⟩ =
1
𝜋√𝑁
 
Thus, to have ⟨∆𝜙⟩ ≥
𝜋
12
, the number of photons 𝑁 ≤ 1.48. Therefore, the total number 
of photons in the beam should be 3𝑁 ≤ 4.5. 
III. Trojan Horse Attack 
A Trojan horse attack [49] that can be launched by Eve is shown in Figure 17. 
During this attack, Eve can inject an optical beam with a known state of polarization right 
Figure 17 : Diagram of a Trojan horse attack on the three-stage protocol 
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before Bob applies his transformation 𝑈𝐵. Then Eve will filter out her photons at the 
second stage of the protocol. By measuring and comparing the polarization states of the 
injected and the recovered photons, Eve can now estimate the polarization transformation 
introduced by Bob (𝑈𝐵). During the execution of the protocol in the third stage, Eve can 
launch an intercept and resend attack. Having a prior knowledge of the transformation 𝑈𝐵, 
she will be able to recover the value of 𝑋 being sent.  
To defeat a Trojan horse attack, Alice and Bob should actively monitor the 
intensity of the optical beam at each end. This can be implemented using auxiliary 
detectors and active monitoring of any incoming beam. Furthermore, one can use an 
“optical fuse” to monitor any increase in the beam intensity over the channel. An increase 
in the beam intensity takes place in case Eve injects an optical beam with a slightly higher 
intensity than the one she siphoned off. It is worth noting that the intensity threshold at 
which the protocol is operating is preset before the onset of the implementation and is 
mainly determined by the number of photons used by Alice and Bob. Furthermore, the 
noise on the channel can be characterized prior to any data exchange; thus Alice and Bob 
can know whether the intensity fluctuations were due to eavesdropping or to noise.  
IV. Hardware Countermeasures 
In order to limit the vulnerability of a system implementing the three-stage 
protocol to the attacks discussed above, one can implement the following hardware 
countermeasures: 
1. Limit the maximum number of photons to a value less than that proposed earlier. 
We call this method the multi-photon tolerant approach. Using this approach one 
can guarantee that an eavesdropper cannot measure the actual polarization state 
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over a given leg of the protocol; thus, the message 𝑋 is transmitted at a quantum 
secure level while using multiple photons in each pulse. The use of a single photon 
to encode each bit maintains the security level of the BB84 protocol while 
removing its major limitations. It loosens the limits on the distance, data rates, and 
single photon generation and detection. It is worth noting that we use the value 
3𝑁 ≤ 4.5 found in section II.ii; this is due to the assumption that Eve will use the 
method where she needs the least number of photons in order to launch her attack. 
2. Actively monitor   the intensity of the optical beam at each receiving end. This 
can be implemented using auxiliary detectors and active monitoring of any 
incoming light. Furthermore, one can use an optical fuse to monitor any increase 
in the beam intensity over the channel. An increase in the beam intensity takes 
place in case Eve injects an optical beam with slightly higher intensity than the 
one she siphoned.  
3. A “door” function can be applied as well; this is an effective countermeasure 
against a Trojan horse attack. This door can be thought of as a narrow band filter 
that will disallow Eve from injecting light at a wavelength different than that used 
during communication. Therefore, Eve’s presence can be detected through 
intensity measurements that can be carried out as proposed in 2. Furthermore, the 
door function can open access to the channel only once a legitimate signal has 
been sent through the channel. In other words, the system will be in an idle state 
as long as Alice and Bob are not sending any information over the channel. 
4. Alice and Bob must implement a QBER check at the end of the execution of the 
protocol. Once the QBER measured is higher than a certain threshold, the presence 
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of an eavesdropper on the channel is detected. The communicated message should 
be discarded. The QBER threshold varies from one medium to another since it 
depends highly on the noise and environmental changes. 
V. Comparison with Single-photon Protocols 
 The multi-stage protocol is a multi-photon tolerant protocol that differs from the 
single-photon protocols in many aspects. We now compare it with the BB84 protocol 
which is the prime example of a single photon protocol: 
1) Multi-stage protocols use pulses of photonic beams consisting of 𝑚𝑁 photons 
per pulse. The BB84 protocol uses a single photon per pulse. 
2) The underlying physical principles used to prove security are the same, yet 
emphasized differently. The multi-stage protocol is based on the Heisenberg 
uncertainty principle mainly by the fact that measuring a state of polarization 
with fewer numbers of photons than needed will generate quantum noise that 
an eavesdropper cannot overcome. On the other hand, the BB84 is mainly 
based on the no-cloning theorem and its underlying fact that a copy of a photon 
cannot be generated with accuracy. 
3) It should be noted that the operation of the multi-stage protocol is comparable 
to that of the BB84 if the number of photons 𝑚𝑁 is restricted to no more than 
one. In this case the multi-stage protocol can operate with only two different 
polarization transformations at each end of the communication. In other words 
the protocol will be using only four different polarization angles to secure the 
transmission of a single photon.  
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4) It might seem that in BB84 no prior secret string (initialization vector) is 
needed to start the communication. This is not the case since in order to 
authenticate the messages sent through the public channel, Alice and Bob need 
a common secret string to start with. Thus, the assumption is made in the 
key/message expansion multi-stage protocol that Alice and Bob share some 
random string (initialization vector); this is implicitly made in BB84 as well 
[74].  
5) In the BB84 protocol, the receiver as well as the intruder is required to 
distinguish among four different polarization angles. Thus, both the receiver 
and the intruder measurements are probabilistic. In the case of a multi-stage 
protocol, an intruder Eve will be faced with identifying from among an infinite 
number of polarization angles. In contrast, the intended receiver only needs to 
distinguish between two orthogonal polarization angles.  
VI. Conclusion 
 This chapter has analyzed the security of the multi-stage, multi-photon tolerant 
protocol for quantum secure communication. The security of the multi-stage protocol is 
based on the fact that while a legitimate receiver only needs to distinguish between two 
orthogonal polarization states, an intruder has to distinguish among an infinite number of 
possible polarization states. In other words, while the receiver would need only one 
photon to do so, an intruder would need to siphon off a minimum number 𝑛 of photons 
per stage. The results presented in this chapter set an upper bound on the number of 
photons at 3𝑁 ≤ 4.5 in the case of the three-stage protocol. As long as the average 
number of photons that  Eve can siphon off from each leg is less than 𝑁, the 
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communication between the parties is expected to be secure from a photon number 
splitting attack. The chapter has also assessed the security of the generalized multi-stage 
protocol to the Trojan horse attack and the additional measures for defying such attacks 
have been proposed. The proposed security analysis is discussed in the case of the three-
stage multi-photon protocol; however, it should be noted that this analysis can be 
generalized to any case of the multi-stage protocol. Furthermore, a comparison between 
the BB84 protocol and the multi-stage protocol has been presented. The proposed security 
analysis discussed demonstrates that a multi-photon protocol can provide quantum secure 
communication while using a larger average number of photons. This in turn enhances 
the performance of the multi-stage protocol compared to its single-photon counterparts.  
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Chapter 5: Security Analysis of the Multi-stage Protocol 
 
The previous chapters presented a multi-stage, multi-photon quantum 
cryptography protocol based on the double-lock cryptography. As mentioned earlier, the 
multi-stage protocol exploits the asymmetry in the detection strategies between the 
legitimate users and the eavesdropper. In this chapter, we study the security of the multi-
photon protocol using coherent states by demonstrating its security against the intercept-
resend (IR) attack, the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack, and the man-in-the-middle 
(MIM) attack. It is found that the mean photon number of the coherent pulses can generally 
be greater than 1. The protocol thus has the potential to allow QC using detectors that may 
not be very efficient.  
The principle behind the multi-photon, multi-stage protocol discussed earlier is 
essentially the same as that of the classical double-lock cryptography. Security is given by 
the asymmetry in the detection strategies between the legitimate users and the 
eavesdropper, which is provided by the advantage creation akin to that utilized in the 
optimal quantum receiver in the Y00 (or αη) protocol [73] and the keyed communication 
in quantum noise (KCQ) method [95].  
This chapter calculates the secure key rate in terms of the optimal error probability 
of eavesdropping.  In addition, it devises an authentication method to check for the 
potential man-in-the-middle attack that could be launched by the eavesdropper and 
determined the modified secure key rate achievable in the presence of such an attack. It is 
worth noting that in case the key/message expansion protocol proposed in Chapter 3 is 
used, the three-stage protocol acts as a quantum communication protocol rather than key 
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distribution protocol. However, in the authentication method developed in this chapter the 
three-stage protocol is assumed to be a QKD protocol.  In addition, an estimate of the 
maximal mean photon number when the channel loss is taken into account is calculated. 
This chapter also provides a detailed analysis of  the security of the simplest form of the 
multi-stage protocol, the three-stage protocol. The dependence of the error probabilities in 
terms of the number of photons utilized in the channel is studied.  
The amount of polarization rotations that both sides (Alice and Bob) select to give 
to the information bits is an arbitrary and independent value which varies from 0 to 𝜋 
degrees. It should be noted that practically one must also take into account the difficulties 
with maintaining fidelity in the presence of noise. In the following analysis, such a 
requirement is ignored and it is assumed that Alice and Bob can maintain perfect alignment 
in their basis for simplicity. 
I. Intercept-Resend (IR) and Photon Number Splitting (PNS) Attacks 
 
First, consider the situation that the communication between Alice and Bob is 
“authenticated”, i.e., Alice knows that the information she sends out passes through Bob 
in the intermediate step and vice versa. Under this assumption, Eve can launch intercept-
resend (IR) attacks, or more importantly, the photon-number-splitting (PNS) attack. 
The main difference between IR and PNS is that, in IR all the photons are being 
taken out by Eve and she then resends any photon state to Bob. On the other hand, under 
PNS attack, the number of photons Bob receives is less than that in the original pulse. Such 
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a loss of photons practically could be due to the channel loss, but in this analysis it is 
attributed to the action of the intruder.  
If we further restrict ourselves to the situation of incoherent attacks, Eve is required 
to perform measurements before the classical post processing. Therefore, under the IR 
attack, the polarization states of the pulses resent by Eve usually are different from those 
she intercepts because of the measurement process, with the difference depending on the 
number of photons she receives.  The security against the IR attack can be estimated by 
assuming the polarization states of the resent pulses are the same as those before the pulses 
are intercepted by Eve. This is an overestimation of the ability of Eve. Nevertheless, it 
enables us to analyze IR and PNS attacks using the same formalism. In addition, Eve’s 
information 𝐼𝐸𝐴 and 𝐼𝐸𝐵 become identical, where ):(max Eve AEII EA   is the maximal 
mutual information between Eve and Alice with a similar expression for 𝐼 (𝐸 ∶  𝐵). 
For the IR and PNS attacks on the three-stage protocol, Eve only needs to measure 
the polarization angles of any two stages. Then she can extract the bit value by orienting 
her measurement device in the third stage according to the angles of the first and second 
stages.  
  More definitely, suppose the polarization angles of the three stages of the protocol 
are denoted by   X1 ,   X2  and   X3 , where 𝑋 is the information 
bit angle (0 or  
𝜋
2
), and 𝛼 and 𝛽 are the angles associated with Alice’s and Bob’s unitary 
transformations. Then the corresponding angles estimated by Eve for the first two stages 
are written as  ˆˆˆ1  X  and 
ˆˆˆˆ
2  X . As a result, the estimate of the polarization 
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rotation applied by Bob is 12
ˆˆˆ   . In order for Eve to obtain useful information, she 
requires that the error in determining 𝛽 should not be too large. Since 𝑋 is a binary random 
number of either 0 or  
𝜋
2
, Eve will determine the bit value erroneously if
4/)()ˆˆ(ˆ 1212   . The error probability of Eve is then given by 
),|ˆ()(),|ˆ()(ˆˆ),( 2222211111212121 NPPNPPddddNNP
S
e   (5.1) 
where  2/1)( P  is the prior distribution of Alice’s (Bob’s) rotation angle and 
),|ˆ( iiii NP   is the conditional probability of determining iˆ  given the angle i  and the 
mean photon number 𝑁𝑖 that is accessible by Eve. The integration domain 𝑆 corresponds 
to the region where the condition 4/)()ˆˆ( 1212    is satisfied. The mutual 
information 𝐼 (𝐸 ∶  𝐴) is given by )(1):( ePhAEI  .  
Consider a three-stage protocol using coherent states of mean photon number 𝑁. 
First of all, Alice should randomize the phases of the coherent states to avoid Eve 
exploiting the phase information [96]. In this case, the quantum state is described by a 
density matrix with photon number following the Poisson distribution with parameter 𝑁. 
  To obtain a bound of the secure key rate, one has to estimate Eve’s maximal 
information. This involves an optimal measurement strategy to obtain the conditional 
probability ),|ˆ( iiii NP  . Bagan et al. [97] gave a detailed comparison of the estimation 
of the polarization state of a finite number of photons using the collective and local 
measurements. Instead of an optimal polarization measurement, in the following we 
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consider a simple strategy that Eve performs polarization analysis with a fixed basis, 
denoted as horizontal and vertical, that is the same as Alice and Bob’s basis. Such a fixed 
basis measurement is generally not optimal. Nevertheless, we additionally assume that 
Eve can determine the polarization angle correctly using a single basis only, instead of two 
bases that are required for the polarization states on a circle of the Poincaré sphere. This 
is accomplished by attributing Eve’s measured polarization in the correct quadrant as the 
original polarization in the numerical calculations below. This procedure effectively 
doubles the number of photons available to Eve for the estimation, and the fidelity obtained 
is generally even better than that using optimal collective measurements 
  With the measurement strategy mentioned above, the probability distributions of 
Eve’s numbers of horizontal and vertical photons in the three stages are given by 
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for 𝑖 =  1, 2, 3, where 𝑁𝑖 is the mean number of photons in stage 𝑖 that is accessible by 
Eve. Here the continuous variable iˆ  in (5.1) is replaced by the discrete variables 𝑛𝐻,𝑖 and 
 𝑛𝑉,𝑖 . Then i  can be estimated from the numbers of photons detected in the vertical port 
(𝑛𝑉,𝑖) and the horizontal port (𝑛𝐻,𝑖) of the polarization analyzer by iHiVi nn ,,
2 /ˆtan  . Note 
that in (5.2), 𝑛𝐻,𝑖 and 𝑛𝑉,𝑖 cannot be zero simultaneously, for this gives no information to 
Eve about the angle i . Also we assume  𝑁𝑖 is known to Eve. 
For the PNS attack, Eve’s best strategy without causing errors to Bob’s received bits 
will be to take 𝑁 1 =  𝑁2 ~ 
𝑁
2
  if Bob did not monitor the photon statistics. Nevertheless, 
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we require that Bob monitors the number of incoming photons so that Eve cannot probe 
Alice and his devices with very bright pulses. For the IR attack, we can consider 𝑁 1 =
 𝑁2~𝑁. This corresponds to the optimal situation for Eve when the channel is assumed to 
be lossless. For a lossy channel with transmittance t, we consider  𝑁 1 = 𝑁 and  𝑁 2 = 𝑡𝑁 
for IR and  𝑁 1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑁 and  𝑁 1 = (1 − 𝑡)𝑡𝑁 for PNS. Figure 18 gives the plots of 
𝑃𝑒 as a function of the mean photon number 𝑁. It is seen in Figure 18 that even at the mean 
photon number 𝑁 =  10, there is considerable error in Eve’s estimated values of the true 
bit values.  
 
Figure 18: Plots of the (a) IR and (b) PNS error probabilities of Eve as functions of the 
mean number of photons N. 
 
 
  As mentioned previously, Alice and Bob need to monitor the number of incoming 
photons to deny Eve from injecting a very bright beam to probe their encoding devices. 
The presence of Eve is revealed if Alice and Bob also check the photon number 
distribution and detect any loss or change of the distribution. Eve could compensate the 
photon loss in the channel by injecting photons of arbitrary polarizations or at the angles
iˆ , as in the IR attack. Nevertheless, this introduces extra error in her determination of Xˆ  
as well as error in Bob’s bits. In addition, the IR attack in fact induces errors to the bit 
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values obtained by Bob. The estimation of the rotation angle error is addressed by the 
authentication process which specifically handles the man-in-the-middle attack in the next 
section. 
II. Authentication 
  The three-stage protocol can be compromised entirely if Eve launches the man-in-
middle (MIM) attack as depicted in Figure 19. Here Eve impersonates Bob to extract the 
true bit value perfectly. She also impersonates Alice to send the bit angle 𝑋 together with 
the unperturbed angle 𝛽 back to Bob, so that Bob receives the bit without error and hence 
cannot catch Eve. In such an MIM attack, Eve totally separates the quantum 
communication between Alice and Bob.  Therefore the attack could be revealed if 
authentications are made by Alice and Bob to guarantee the locks are legitimate, i.e., they 
are the true users who applied the rotation angles on the pulses they received in the three 
stages. 
 
Figure 19: Schematic diagram of the three-stage protocol under the man-in-the-middle 
(MIM) attack 
 
  In principle, authentication can be performed perfectly if Alice and Bob could 
retain the photons in steps 2 and 3 of the protocol above until the end of the key exchange, 
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which can be accomplished by using quantum memories [98, 99] or slow light 
technologies [100]. More practically they need to perform measurements to determine the 
parameters of the transformations during the key exchange. At the end of the key 
exchange, they check their measured values against the true values (step 6). It should be 
noted that we assume Alice and Bob are authenticated for exchanging classical 
information on a public channel. This will rule out the chance that Eve is also in the middle 
when Alice and Bob try to compare the measurements. 
  We consider that the transmittance of the quantum channel is t. If Alice sends 
pulses with a mean photon number of 𝑁, Bob expects to receive pulses with mean photon 
number 𝑡𝑁 in the first stage and  𝑡3𝑁 in the third stage, and Alice expects to receive pulses 
with mean photon number 𝑡2𝑁 in the second stage. Therefore, for the MIM attack, Eve 
can extract a mean photon number of 𝑡(1 − 𝑡2)𝑁 to obtain the estimate 1ˆ  and a mean 
photon number of 𝑡(1 − 𝑡2)𝑁 to obtain the estimate ˆ . Eve then uses these two angles to 
impersonate Alice and Bob simultaneously. If Bob uses the pulse for authentication 
instead of the normal three-stage, the angle 1
~
  he measures conditioned on 1  will have a 
distribution given by ))1(,|ˆ(),ˆ|
~
( 21111 NtPtNP  . Here 1 is announced to Bob by 
Alice at the end of the protocol. Using this angle, Bob can guess X  with an error 
probability of 
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 On the other hand, in the normal operation when the MIM attack is not present, 
Bob’s error probability is instead given by 
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  It is remarked that (5.3) and (5.4) manifest the fact that, like Eve, Bob and Alice 
cannot estimate the polarization angles with certainty in the middle of the three-stage 
protocol because the photons are not in orthogonal states. 
 
 
Figure 20: Bob’s error probabilities in the estimation of X for the normal three-stage 
operation (blue lines) and under the MIM attack (red lines) at different values of the 
channel transmittance t. The green lines denote the differences between the two error 
probabilities 
 
  Numerical simulations were performed using the measurement scheme described 
in the last section. Figure 20 shows the two error probabilities as functions of the mean 
photon number 𝑁 for different values of the transmittance t. In addition, ),(normal Auth, NtPe
is found analytically to be 
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where In(x) is the modified Bessel function of the first kind and Ln(x) is the modified 
Struve function. 
It is noted in Figure 20 that at small 𝑁 the error probabilities tend to the constant values 
11normAuth, 2   eP  and 5.0
MIMAuth, eP  whereas both probabilities tend to zero at large 
𝑁. When the transmittance decreases, the two error probabilities converge to each other at 
a smaller 𝑁. In addition, the difference normAuth,MIMAuth, ee PP   approaches an asymptotic 
form when 0t , which is non-negligibly greater than zero for 𝑁 <  4.  
III.  Amplification Attack 
 
  So far we have only focused on the situation where Eve makes direct measurement 
using the photons that she siphons off from the quantum channel. Generally she can do 
more with her photons. An important class of attacks is the one that Eve amplifies the 
quantum states that she extracts from the channel. This kind of attack is linked to the 
foundation of the three-stage protocol, that is whether she can find out the angles   and 
 , which are open to her eavesdropping, with high precision. In fact, the purpose of using 
a finite number of photons in the channel is to limit Eve’s precision of measurement. 
  It is well known that the amplification of a quantum state must also accompany 
with the amplification of the noise [101]. For the implementation with coherent states 
discussed in this chapter, Eve does not gain anything by amplifying the signal. Even with 
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the use of squeezed states, Fock states or entangled states to resend pulses to Bob and 
Alice, the intensity check by Alice and Bob will introduce vacuum noise to Eve’s probes, 
and Eve’s information gain may only be modest. 
  On the other hand, it has recently been shown that noiseless amplification of a 
quantum state is possible if a perfect guarantee of success is not required, unlike the usual 
deterministic linear amplification mentioned above [102, 103] .Experiments of amplifying 
coherent states noiselessly have already been demonstrated [104, 105]. This apparently 
imposes a significant drawback to the three-stage protocol. Nevertheless, it should be 
noted that the probabilistic nature of the amplification means that Eve’s bit rate will further 
decrease. More importantly, the implementations of the amplification of coherent states 
operate with high fidelity only when the mean photon number after the gain is around 
unity [104, 105]. The amplification attack works well essentially for very weak coherent 
states but not for the regime of 𝑁 >  1 that we consider in our protocol. The distortion of 
the quantum states at larger 𝑁 introduces noise to the determination of the polarization. 
Further work is needed to quantify the effects of the amplification attack to the security of 
the protocol. 
  Another issue related to the amplification attack on the three-stage protocol is that, 
in the actual implementation, the polarization rotations 𝑈𝐴 and 𝑈𝐴 nevertheless have to be 
confined to a finite set because of the noise and stability of the experimental setup. Such 
limitation may open up the unambiguous state discrimination (USD) attack [106, 107] . 
Fortunately, the polarization rotations are local information that is secret to Alice and Bob 
independently; they can change their sets of the rotations frequently without disclosing 
their actions. This results in an extremely large set of the polarization rotations and 
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effectively mitigates the threat of the USD attack, which requires that the number of 
photons needed must be greater than or equal to the number of polarization states in the 
middle of the three-stage protocol. 
IV. Security and Key Rate Efficiency  
  With error correction and privacy amplification, the expression for the secret key 
rate extractable using one-way classical post processing is [22] 
    EBEA IIBAIRK ,min:  , (5.6) 
where 𝑅 is the raw key rate, ):( BAI  is the mutual information between Alice and Bob, 
and EAI  and EBI  are Eve’s information about the raw key of Alice and Bob respectively. 
We consider the case when 1)()(  BHAH  and )()|()|( QhABHBAH  , where 
)(Qh  is the binary entropy function and 𝑄 is quantum bit error rate (QBER). For the three-
stage protocol, the raw key rate is given by the total bit that Bob measured minus the bits 
for authentication. 
  Assuming the error correction is carried out perfectly and using a very conservative 
estimate for the PNS/IR attack mentioned in Section I with mutual information
 ),(1):( tNNPhAEI e , the security key rate then becomes 
    QhtNNPhfRK e  ),()1( , (5.7) 
where f is the fraction of the MIM attacks launched by Eve, which is estimated by the ratio 
of the measured authentication error probability difference and the expected measured 
authentication error probability difference, i.e., 
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The threshold for the QBER is then determined by the condition 𝐾 >  0 for some given 
𝑓  <  1 and 𝑁. 
  A potentially significant drawback of the three-stage protocol compared to other 
QKD protocols is that it requires multiple quantum communications between Alice and 
Bob, effectively increasing  the photon loss of the channel. On the other hand, the multiple-
photon resilient nature of the protocol allows a larger mean photon number to start with. 
As an estimate, we consider the ratio of the raw bit rates between the three stage protocol 
and the weak-coherent state BB84 with mean photon number 0.5. The ratio is given by 
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V. Conclusion 
This chapter has given a detailed security analysis to a form of quantum 
cryptography protocol, the three-stage multi-photon quantum cryptography system, using 
coherent states to encode qubits. It is important to note that a three-stage protocol can be 
used as a quantum communication protocol if authentication between Alice and Bob is 
established before the onset of the protocol. In case this condition is not met, the three-
stage protocol may be used as a QKD protocol and operate as section II of this chapter has 
described.  In particular, this chapter has showed that the three-stage protocol is resilient 
to the photon number splitting attack, the intercept-resend attack, and the man-in-the-
middle attack with certain error probability thresholds. In addition this chapter has  
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obtained the secure key rate in terms of the error probabilities under the attacks considered. 
Importantly, it has been found that the mean photon number of the coherent states can 
practically be larger than 1, in contrast to most current QKD protocols in which weak 
coherent pulses are considered. The multi-photon multi-stage QKD scheme presented does 
not require pre-sharing of a key between the legitimate users like the Y00 protocol. Hence 
it can be used to complement such multi-photon quantum communication protocols. This 
chapter has also discussed the amplification and unambiguous state discrimination attacks 
and argued that such attacks do not impose significant threat to the multi-stage protocol.  
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Chapter 6: Multi-photon Tolerant Protocols over Fiber Optics 
 
 This chapter investigates the performance aspects of practical quantum secure 
communication over Fiber Optics using multi-photon tolerant protocols [11, 75, 78]. As 
discussed earlier, multi-photon tolerant protocols weaken the limit on the number of 
photons imposed by currently used single photon based quantum key distribution 
protocols. This chapter calculates the secret raw key generation and quantum bit error 
rates as a function of distance over a fiber optic channel for several optimum average 
photon numbers 𝜇 ( referred to as 𝑁 in the previous calculations).  
Multi-photon tolerant protocols can be either used in order to share a key, i.e. for 
QKD, or for direct quantum communication. In addition, multi-stage protocols can be 
used to share a key between Alice and Bob, followed by using the shared key as a seed 
key to a single-stage protocol. We call this process the braiding concept [108]. Security 
aspects of the multi-stage protocol were discussed earlier in Chapters 3˗5.  
This chapter particularly addresses the performance of the single-stage multi-
photon tolerant protocol over fiber optics (FO).The secret raw key generation rates are 
calculated with respect to distance over a fiber optical channel. It is well-known that raw 
key generation rates decrease with the increase in distances. Coherent non-decoying 
quantum states are used in this chapter in order to transfer the encoded bits from Alice to 
Bob. Raw key generation rates are calculated for different optimum average photon 
numbers 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡, and with respect to distances over a fiber optical channel. As discussed in 
Chapters 4 and 5, we consider that 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡corresponding to the single-stage protocol is 
around 1.5 which is one third of the average number of photons derived for the three-
stage protocol. 
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I. Multi-photon Tolerant Protocol Secret Key Rate Formulation  
 
In this section, the secret and raw key rate formulation for the multi-stage protocol 
is introduced. These formulations are used in the rest of the chapter to evaluate the 
performance of the multi-stage protocol over fiber optics. A sender Alice has in her 
possession a list of 𝑀′ symbols. She wishes to share them with Bob using a quantum 
protocol. In the case where Alice and Bob use the BB84, due to the sifting step, they will 
eventually end up with a list of 𝑚′ ≤  𝑀′ symbols even when the channel loss is not 
considered. These raw keys are only partially correlated.  If a multi-stage protocol is used, 
the sifting step is omitted. The keys shared between Alice and Bob will be of 𝑚′ =  𝑀′ 
symbols.  
To extract a short secret key 𝐾 from the raw key of length 𝑙 ≤  𝑚′ , classical post-
processing is required. The length of the final secret key depends on Eve’s information 
about the raw keys.  One way post processing is the most studied and characterized 
procedures and consists of two steps. The first step is error correction (EC), also called 
information reconciliation. At the end of which 𝑚′ becomes shorter and perfectly 
correlated. The second step is privacy amplification (PA) and it is aimed at diminishing 
Eve’s knowledge of the reference raw key.  
 In the asymptotic case where 𝑀′ → ∞, the meaningful quantity is the secret 
fraction: 
𝑟 = lim
𝑀→∞
𝑙
𝑚′
 
𝑟 is the quantity for which the security proofs in [22] provide an explicit expression. 
However, a more practical parameter must also be taken into account as well: namely the 
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raw-key rate 𝑅, i.e., the length of the raw key that can be produced per unit time. These 
rates depend on the protocol used and on the details of the implementation setup such as 
the source used, losses in the channel, and efficiency and type of detectors.  In conclusion, 
to assess the performance of practical single-stage protocol, the secret key rate is defined 
as:  
𝐾 = 𝑅𝑟                          (6.1) 
i. Raw Key Rate (R) formulation 
 
The raw key rate R is given by (6.2) 
𝑅 = 𝑠𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥) = 𝑠 ∑ 𝑝𝐴(𝑛) [1 − (1 − 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑐)
𝑛
] 
𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛=1           (6.2) 
The factor 𝑠 is the repetition rate of the source used and 𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥) is Bob’s detection 
probability. The number of photons 𝑛′ is distributed according to the Poissonian statistics 
of mean 𝜇 = 〈𝑛′〉, 𝑝𝐴(𝑛) =  
𝜇𝑛′
𝑛!
𝑒−𝜇. Alice encodes her bit in one photon with frequency 
𝑝𝐴(𝑛′ = 1), in two photons with frequency 𝑝𝐴(𝑛′ = 2), and so on, and does nothing with 
frequency 𝑝𝐴(𝑛′ = 0). 𝑑𝑒𝑡  is the quantum efficiency of the detector (typically 10% at 
telecom wavelengths) and 
𝑞𝑐
 is the attenuation due to losses in the quantum channel.  
For fiber optics links with length 𝐷, 
𝑞𝑐
 is given by 

𝑞𝑐
= 10
−𝛼1𝐷
10 ,              (6.3) 
where 1 is the attenuation coefficient in dB/km at telecom wavelengths of interest. 
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ii. Secret fraction (r) formulation 
 
The observed perturbations in the quantum channel due to Eve’s intervention 
allow computation of a bound on the information that Eve might have access to during 
the transmission.  Such a lower bound for security has been proven for many protocols in 
the uncalibrated-device scenario. In this chapter the derivation and analysis in [22] is 
followed in order to determine the lower bound respective to the three-stage protocol.  
The secret fraction using one-way post-processing is given by (6.4):  
𝑟 = [1 − ℎ(𝑄) − 𝐼𝐸],                 (6.4) 
where ℎ(𝑥)the binary entropy is function, and 𝑄 is the quantum bit error rate (QBER).  
Eve’s information about the raw key shared between Alice and Bob is represented by 𝐼𝐸. 
Eve’s information about the raw key must be kept at a minimum and should be less than 
the mutual information shared between Alice and Bob. Therefore, Alice and Bob should 
remove from the raw key a fraction equal to Eve’s information about the raw key.  
Hence (6.1) can be written as follows 
𝐾 = 𝑅[1 − ℎ(𝑄) − 𝐼𝐸]                  (6.5) 
iii. Secret Key Rate (K) formulation 
 
For a practical single-stage system, the secret key 𝐾 should contain only quantities that 
are known from calibration or from the parameter estimation of the protocol (𝑅, 𝑄).  
Therefore, it is important to find an expression for 𝐼𝐸 in terms of these quantities.  
During the operation of the single-stage protocol, Alice and Bob need not to affect a 
sifting process due to the fact that the same basis is used during the encoding and the 
measurement procedure. Therefore, the detection rate for the events 𝑅𝑛′ for the single-
stage protocol does not include the sifting probability. Hence, 
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𝑅𝑛 = 𝑠 𝑝𝐴(𝑛′) 𝑓𝑛′,                    (6.6) 
where 𝑓𝑛′ is the probability that Eve forwards some signal to Bob for 𝑛-photon pulses. 
Eve’s attack must be optimized over the possibility {𝑓𝑛′}𝑛′ ≥ 0 compatible with       
∑ 𝑅𝑛′𝑛′  = 𝑅. 
Based on the formulation in [22],  the quantity to be subtracted in privacy 
amplification (PA) 𝐼𝐸 is given in (6.7) [22, 32, 81, 82, 109, 110] . For simplicity we 
consider: 
𝐼𝐸 = 1 − 𝑌1[1 − ℎ(𝜀1)] = 1 − 𝑌1 [1 − ℎ (
𝑄
𝑌1
⁄ )],                (6.7) 
where 𝑌1 is given by [22]: 
𝑌1 = 1 −
𝑠
𝑅
𝑝𝐴(𝑛′ ≥ 2) = 1 −
𝜇
2𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑐
.                         (6.8) 
The corresponding achievable secret key rate 𝐾 in (6.5) can be written as 
𝐾 = 𝑅 {𝑌1 [1 − ℎ (
𝑄
𝑌1
⁄ )] − ℎ(𝑄)}.                (6.9) 
iv. Optimizing The Secret Key rate K  
 
Alice and Bob can optimize 𝐾 by changing the parameters of the source, typically 
the intensity. There exists an optimum value for the intensity 𝜇 = 〈𝑛′〉 or the average 
number of photons. However, this optimum value cannot be estimated exactly in general, 
because 𝑌1 in (6.8) depends on 𝜇. Using the approximate expressions and formulations 
for 𝑌1 from [22], the secret key rate 𝐾 can be written as, 
𝐾 = 𝑅 {(1 −
𝜇
2𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑐
) {1 − ℎ(2𝑄)} − ℎ(𝑄)}.            (6.10) 
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By calculating the secret key rate 𝐾 as a function of 𝜇 at a fixed channel length, 
an optimum K value can be obtained at an optimum value of intensity referred to in this 
chapter as 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡.  In Section II, we specifically use a short optical fiber (𝐷 ≈ 0) for the 
calculation of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡.This short distance represents a lossless channel. 
To find an expression for 𝑄 one needs to include the contributions of dark counts 
and the above definition for 𝑅 in (6.2).  The raw key rate can then be written as 
𝑅 = 𝑣𝑠(𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏 + 𝑃𝑑)                (6.11) 
𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏 is given by  
            𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥) = ∑ 𝑝𝐴(𝑛) [1 − (1 − 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑐)
𝑛′
]
𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥
𝑛′=1       (6.12) 
𝑃𝑑  is the dark count rate given by 
𝑃𝑑 = 2𝑝𝑑 ∑ 𝑝𝐴(𝑛′)[1 − 𝑑𝑒𝑡𝑞𝑐]
𝑛′
𝑛′≥0              (6.13) 
where 𝑝𝑑 = 10
−5 is the dark count.  The expected error rate 𝑄 or QBER can be written 
as follows [111] 
𝑄 =
𝜀𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏+
1
2
𝑃𝑑
𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏+𝑃𝑑
,              (6.14) 
where the error rate on the channel is given by 𝜀 =
1−𝑉𝑖𝑠𝑖𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦
2
 and the dark counts always  
gives an error of 
1
2
.   
The number of photons n’ that Alice encodes her bit can vary as 𝑛′  1 for 
 𝑃𝐵𝑜𝑏(𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥) and 𝑛′  0 for 𝑃𝑑. Finally, using the optimum value of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡, one can 
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calculate the secret key rate 𝐾 from (6.10) as a function of distance. Also, one can 
calculate 𝑄 as a function of distance. 
II. Secret Key Rate, Error Rate Data and Results  
 
First, to find 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 that corresponds to the optimum secret key rate 𝐾 from (6.10), 
we assume the following: 1) a maximum number of photons 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 that Alice can use to 
encode her bit, which is to represent a multi-photon beam with a specific number of 
emitted photons; 2) a lossless fiber optics channel which corresponds to a channel of 
length 𝐷 ≈ 0; 3) operating wavelength of  = 1550 nm ; and 4) a typical quantum 
efficiency of the detector 
𝑑𝑒𝑡
= 0.1 and the dark count 𝑝𝑑 = 10
−5.  
To shed light onto the relationship between the maximum number of photons 
and 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡, we varied the maximum number of photons from 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 12  and 
found 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡. The results are shown in Figure 21 below. Figure 22 plots the relationship 
between maximum key rate and 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡. By examining the relationship shown in Figure 22, 
one notices that the relationship is far from linear and K reaches a saturation limit at 
around 8-10 photons.  
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Figure 22: Plot of the maximum key rate as a function of the optimum average number 
of photons 𝝁𝒐𝒑𝒕  for a lossless fiber optics length 
 
Figure 21: Plot of the optimum average number of photons 𝝁𝒐𝒑𝒕 as the function of 
the maximum number of photons 𝑵𝒎𝒂𝒙 that Alice can used to encode her bits 
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In Figure 23 we used  the optimum average of photons values: 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, 
2.1 and 2.6 that corresponding to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1, 2, 3, and 4 respectively (as shown in Figure 
21) to calculate the secret key as a function of distance and channel losses. As mentioned 
before, the inset of Figure 23 shows the secret key rate from (6.10) as a function of 𝜇, and 
the maximum 𝐾 value occurs at 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6 for 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 4 photons. This result falls within 
the security proofs of the three-stage protocol established in [112]; in other words the 
three-stage protocol can achieve a maximum key rate while providing a quantum secure 
communication. Using (6.12), (6.13) and (6.14), the secret key values from (6.10) can be 
calculated as a function of distance with 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 as a parameter. These calculations are 
plotted in Figure 23 where error correction (EC) and private amplifications (PA) are 
included for a non-decoying coherent state. It can be seen that an increase in the average 
number of photons means an increase in the achievable distance while maintaining a 
higher key rate. As is the case in 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 where a longer distance is achieved while having a 
key rate higher than the cases were 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, and 2.6.  
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Figure 23: Plot of the maximum achievable key rate as the function of the distance for   
𝝁𝒐𝒑𝒕= 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, and 2.6 
 
The maximum possible distances (𝐷𝑚𝑎𝑥) that can be achieved at the four values 
of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡  can be found from Figure 23 at the fall off K values.  Similarly, we can find the 
maximum possible distances for the remaining 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 values found in Figure 21 above. The 
relationship between these maximum distances and 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 are shown in Figure 24. This 
relationship can be used to estimate the maximum possible distance that can be achieved 
for any value of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡.    
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Figure 24:  Plot of the maximum achievable distance as function of the optimum 
average number of photons 𝝁𝒐𝒑𝒕 
 
Figure 25 shows the effects of error correction (EC) and privacy amplifications 
(PA) for a non-decoy state at 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6 as a function of distance and channel losses 
(inset). It can be noted that these effects are small for short distances and losses values. 
However as we approach the maximum possible distance the channel loses increase thus 
EC and PA have more severe effects on the key rate. This leads to a sharp drop in the 
secret key rate at the distance of about 120 km (or the loss of about 30 dB).  
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Figure 25: Plot of the secret key rate as a function of the distance (Km) and losses (dB) 
for 𝝁𝒐𝒑𝒕=2.6 
 
    Figure 26 shows the influence of the wavelength used on the secret key rate values for 
𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6 at  = 1550 nm, 1300 nm, and 800 nm with attenuation coefficients of 0.25, 
0.35, 2 dB/km, and detector efficiencies of 0.9, 0.1, and 0.1, respectively. The achievable 
distance is higher at  = 1550 nm that is due to the low attenuation of the medium at this 
wavelength.  The attenuation coefficient affects the secret key rate through the variable 

𝑞𝑐
 as seen from (6.3).  
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Figure 26: Plot of the key rate as a function of the distance (Km) 
 
Using (6.12) and (6.13), the error rate 𝑄 or QBER in (6.14) can be calculated as a 
function of distance. Figure 27 shows the variation of the QBER as a function of the 
distance for 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, and 2.6. The QBER at 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6 which is the optimum 
value derived from Figure 23 exerts the same increasing pattern as in the cases of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 
0.95, 1.5, and 2.1. The only difference is the distance at which the value of QBER 
increases sharply. 
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Figure 27: Plot of the QBER as a function of the distance (Km) for μopt = 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, 
and 2.6 
III. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has investigated the performance aspects of a practical quantum 
secure communication using multi-photon tolerant protocols. The security of such 
protocols stems from the fact that the optimal detection strategies of the legitimate user 
and the eavesdropper are asymmetrical, allowing Bob to obtain measurement results 
deterministically, while imposing unavoidable quantum noise to the eavesdropper Eve’s 
measurement. This chapter has also presented the results of a study of multi-photon 
tolerant multi-stage protocols, security aspects as well as challenges to the practical 
implementation. In this chapter, coherent non-decoying quantum states have been used 
to transfer the encoded bits from Alice to Bob. The maximum number of photons that 
Alice can use to encode her bit was varied from 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 12. An optimum 
value 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 has been found for each 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 and as a result a relationship between both 
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values has been derived. Also, a linear relationship has been obtained between the 
maximum distance that can be achieved and 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡. However, by examining the 
relationship between the maximum key rate as a function of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡, one notices that the 
relationship is far from linear and K reaches a saturation limit at around 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 4.8 – 5.8 
that corresponds to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 8 − 10 photons.  
The relationship between the secret key generation rates for 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, 
and 2.6 has been calculated with respect to both losses and distances over a fiber optical 
channel. This chapter has shown that at 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6, the key generation rates are higher 
than the cases were 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, and 2.1. It is worth noting that the BB84 operates at 
𝜇 = 0.1, which is much less than the case of the multi-stage protocol. The QKD multi-
stage protocol using a coherent state uses an average of 1.5 photons per stage. However, 
in case it is used as a communication protocol the average number of photon number per 
stage is 3.3.  Furthermore, this chapter has shown that the QBER in case of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6 
exerts the same characteristics as in the cases of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, and 2.1; the only 
difference is the distance at which the value of QBER increases sharply. The calculations 
derived in this chapter can be generalized to evaluate the performance of any multi-stage 
QKD or communication protocol.   
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Chapter 7: Application of the Multi-stage Protocol in IEEE 802.11i 
 
The dynamics of the work force environment has evolved substantively by the 
introduction of wireless communication. Professionals nowadays can work without being 
tied to a certain location. In addition to the advantages of mobility, wireless networks 
gained popularity due to various other benefits such as: convenience, productivity, 
deployment, and expandability. While wireless networks are becoming more popular day 
after day, related security issues are expanding in unison. Due to their nature, snooping 
and modifying a transmitted wireless signal is easier compared to its wired counterpart. 
The focus of this chapter is to present a model of integration of the multi-stage 
quantum cryptography protocol into the IEEE 802.11 wireless communication standard. 
It proposes a method to integrate the three-stage quantum cryptography protocol and its 
variants into the key distribution scheme of the IEEE 802.11 standard. Integrating the 
three-stage protocol with the IEEE 802.11 standard offers several benefits compared to 
the utilization of its single-photon counterpart. These benefits are: enhanced data rates, 
longer distance, and an increased number of photons that can be used during the 
transmission process. Integrating the multi-stage protocol and the three-stage protocol 
into the IEEE 802.11 network will provide such networks with a security level 
comparable to that of quantum cryptography. 
I. IEEE 802.11i 
The IEEE 802.11i standard defines a Robust Security Network Association 
(RSNA) based on IEEE 802.1X [113] authentication. RSNA is defined in order to provide 
better authentication and confidentiality in 802.11 networks compared to that of WEP. 
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Three entities are involved in the authentication process: the Supplicant, the 
Authenticator, and the Authentication Server. In general, a supplicant and an 
authenticator have successful authentication after they verify each other’s identity and 
generate a secret key that can be used in following data transmissions.  
The process of authentication in the IEEE 802.11i consists of handshakes between 
the authenticator and the authentication server, between the supplicant and the 
authentication server, and between the supplicant and the authenticator. The handshakes 
used in the process of authentication result in the generation of a common secret key 
called the Master Session Key (MSK). The MSK key is shared between the supplicant 
and the authentication server and is used by the supplicant to derive a Pairwise Master 
Key (PMK). The authenticator derives the same PMK using the Authentication, 
Authorization and Accounting (AAA) key material on the server side that is securely 
transferred to it. In other cases, the supplicant and the authenticator may be configured 
using a static Pre-Shared Key (PSK) to generate the PMK. In some other cases such as 
re-association, a cached PMK can be used in order to reduce the overhead employed on 
the authentication server when the same user undergoes repeated authentication 
processes. 
After the establishment of a PMK, a four-way handshake protocol is executed. 
The four-way handshake key management protocol confirms the existence of the PMK, 
and the protocol generates a Pairwise Transient Key (PTK) for each subsequent session, 
synchronizes its installation into the MAC, and transfers the Group Transient Key (GTK) 
from the authenticator to the supplicants. Successful implementation of the four-way 
handshake means that a secure communication channel can be constructed between the 
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authenticator and the supplicant during the following data transmissions. The same PMK 
can be used in different four-way handshakes. 
i. The four way handshake 
 
Once the key between the authenticator and supplicant has been shared, the four-
way handshake process will be started either by the authenticator itself or after a request 
from the supplicant. The message exchange is shown in Figure 28.  
 
Figure 28: four-way handshake message exchange between an Access Point AP and a 
Station STA 
The EAP exchange performed prior to the four-way handshake provides the shared PMK 
secret key. This key should be exposed as little as possible since it is intended to last for 
the complete session. The four-way handshake is actually used to establish another key 
called the PTK which is generated by concatenating the following attributes: PMK, 
ANonce, SNonce, AP MAC address, and STA MAC address. The product is then passed 
through a cryptographic hash function. 
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 The messages exchanged during the handshake represented in Figure 28 are explained 
below [114]: 
1. The Access Point  (AP) sends a nonce-value to the Station  STA (ANonce). The 
STA now has all the elements needed to construct the PTK. 
2. The STA sends its own nonce-value (SNonce) to the AP together with a MIC 
(message integrity code). 
3. The AP sends the GTK and a sequence number together with another MIC to be 
used in the next multicast or broadcast frame. In this way, the STA can perform 
basic replay detection. 
4. The STA sends an acknowledgement to the AP. 
The PTK is then subdivided into three main parts: Key Confirmation Key (KCK), Key 
Encryption Key (KEK), and Temporal Key (TK).  Figure 29 depicts the pairwise key 
hierarchy: 
Pairwise master key (PMK)
EAPOL-key confirmation key
KCK
EAPOL-key encryption key
KEK
EAPOL-key temporal key
KTK
 
Figure 29: Pairwise key hierarchy 
Some of the flaws of four-way handshake are explored in [114-118].  In addition, 
the tool Aircrack-ng is a 802.11 WEP and WPA-PSK keys cracking program that can 
recover keys once enough data packets have been captured. To prevent such attacks and 
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provide theoretically proved secure communication, the authors  [119] proposed the 
integration of the BB84 protocol into the four-way handshake. The four-way handshake 
with integrated QKD is called the quantum handshake. Quantum handshake is discussed 
in the rest of the chapter. 
II.  Integration of QKD for key distribution in IEEE 802.11i 
IEEE 802.11 wireless local area networks are  a suitable candidate to be used in 
conjunction with quantum key distribution protocols. That is due to its limited coverage 
area of around 200 meters. Wi-Fi networks can offer a line-of-sight path, which is a major 
requirement for QKD. Furthermore, the sum of users of Wi-Fi is increasing significantly. 
Currently, all laptops are equipped with a Wi-Fi interface by default. This indicates that 
Wi-Fi networks must provide secured connections for the users of their services. As 
discussed in the previous chapters, QKD has the ability of providing unconditional 
security, thus it can offer Wi-Fi networks with the highest level of security that can be 
achieved. 
The mode of integrating QKD into the key distribution process in Wi-Fi networks 
has been done with minimal modifications to the existing IEEE 802.11 and IEEE 802.1X 
protocols. The communication process implementing the four-way handshake and the 
initial exchange of capability parameters are the only key areas impacted when 
integrating QKD in the IEEE 802.11i standard. 
In IEEE 802.11 standard, during the first flows of the communication, association 
between STA and AP is established. These initial flows involve Beacon, Probe Request 
and Probe Response frames. The beacon frame enables stations to establish and maintain 
communications in an arranged method.  STA and AP use the initial flow messages to 
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agree on the set of parameters used for following communications.  When QKD is 
integrated in the process, it is necessary that the STA and the AP agree on all QKD related 
parameters at the beginning. These key parameters include: QKD protocol, reconciliation 
method, hash function used in privacy amplification, and quantum transmission rate. 
QKD parameters should be negotiated via Beacon, Probe Request, and Probe Response 
messages. Since the Beacon and the Probe Response frames contain Capability 
information fields, AP will inform prospective STAs of its capabilities of supporting 
QKD via the Capability information field. In addition STA, on its side, informs a 
prospective AP of its capabilities of supporting QKD via the Request Information and 
Vendor Specific fields. The information capability elements are used to transfer all the 
QKD specifics. It is worth noting that when any STA or AP does not support QKD, it can 
still proceed with the original IEEE 802.11i protocol. 
The protocol proposed to integrate the QKD process in the IEEE 802.11i networks is 
shown in  Figure 30 below and described as follows[119, 120]: 
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STA AP
(16) Error Estimation
(17) Reconciliation
(18) Privacy Amplification
Quantum Key
Distribution
Start data encryption using TK Start data encryption using TK
Verify Q-MIC
Q-Key Recovered = PTK
Retrieve key hierarchy:
KCK, KEK, TK, GTK
Q-Key Recovered = PTK
Retrieve key hierarchy:
KCK, KEK, TK, GTK
Switch back to
Wireless 
Channel
Switch back to
Wireless 
Channel
Switch to Quantum Channel
(19) Q-MIC
(20) Success, Q-MIC
(14) Send Photons
(15) Sifting 
 
Figure 30: Quantum handshake procedure 
The overall communication is hybrid and is done via two channels: Quantum 
Channel and Classical Channel. The quantum channel is used to transmit polarized 
photons that represent the key bits only at the beginning of the quantum handshake. After 
the PMK has been shared, both STA and AP switch to the quantum channel. On the other 
hand, the classical channel is then used later on to retrieve the final secret key by 
implementing the proposed quantum handshake protocol.   
After EAP Key message, both STA and AP start the QKD protocol by switching 
to the quantum channel. In flow (14) of Figure 30 the STA sends a sequence of polarized 
photons representing the random key that STA intends to share with the AP. Flow (14) 
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corresponds to the first three steps of the BB84 protocol. The number of photons that an 
STA sends depends on the length of the PTK, the QKD protocol used, and the privacy 
amplification algorithm. Sufficient number of photons should be sent, since during the 
communication over the classical channel, some of these bits conveyed over the quantum 
channel get discarded. Bits are eliminated due to: sifting, dark counts of apparatus, error 
estimation, reconciliation, privacy amplification, errors introduced due to noise, and 
environmental conditions. 
When the AP receives the photons it affects step 4 of the BB84 protocol. Then 
AP and STA switch back to the classical channel. From this point forwards, the key 
recovery process based on the BB84 protocol takes place. Using EAPOL frames for 
communication, AP and STA remove the bits that are in error and end up with identical 
and secured key. During flow (15) of Figure 30 they affect the sifting process of the BB84 
protocol. Using flow (16) of Figure 30 STA and AP effect the step of error estimation of 
the BB84 protocol.  
Using flow (17) of Figure 30, STA and AP effect the most crucial phase of the 
quantum handshake corresponding to the reconciliation process. This is step in the BB84 
protocol is done to correct the errors in their keys and recover identical keys. The error 
correction algorithm that the STA and AP will follow at this stage has already been 
decided by the Beacon, Probe Request and Probe Response messages at the beginning of 
the communication. The STA and AP implement the reconciliation protocol agreed on 
via EAPOL message communications. At the end of the reconciliation phase both STA 
and AP have identical copies of an error free key.  The next step is the privacy 
amplification implemented using flow (18) of Figure 30.  
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The final key recovery process of the quantum handshake involves removing 
some bits from their position in the raw key. In this case, the quantum transmission must 
ensure sending a sufficient number of photons in order to recover the final key that 
contains a number of bits at least equal or greater than that of PMK. Any extra bits of the 
final key will be removed so that it will have the same length as PTK.  
Using flow (19) of Figure 30, STA sends Q-MIC to AP. AP calculates its own 
version of Q-MIC and upon receiving Q-MIC from STA, it compares it with the Q-MIC 
version it has calculated. If they match, the STA is authenticated and AP will send a 
success message using flow 20.Since the PTK is shared by performing QKD, PTK is 
unconditionally secure. Thus the rest of the key structure of 802.11 comprising KCK, 
KEK and TK inherit the same level of security as PTK.  
i.  Disadvantages of the approach described to integrate QKD into IEEE 802.11i 
 
Integrating the BB84 into the four-way handshake of the IEEE 802.11i protocol has 
several limitations: 
1. The AP and STA might not be able to have a direct line of sight even in an 
environment where an AP and STA are only distant by few meters. In such cases 
the solution is to use the original IEEE 802.11i protocol. 
2. A single photon generator and single photon detectors are required on both AP 
and STA sides. Due to the Heisenberg uncertainty principle, we cannot have any 
device that can reliably generate a single photon per time slot. Current QKD 
systems rely on attenuated laser pulse that may generate less than one photon per 
time slot, thus all but guaranteeing that most time slots will be either empty or 
carry no more than a single photon per pulse. Therefore, an STA will need much 
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more time to send the required number of photons, and in addition photon pulses 
containing more than one photon per pulse will make the system vulnerable to the 
photon number splitting attacks. On the other hand, avalanche photodetectors are 
used at the AP side. APDs require a cooling temperature of -50 C to reduce the 
dark counts. Also in a wireless environment, vulnerability of a signal containing 
a single photon to environmental noise will be higher than its wired counterpart. 
This is why it is important to look into solutions where different QKD multi 
photon tolerant protocols can be used. 
3. The requirement of a single photon per pulse for BB84 limits the distance and the 
data rate at which the PTK can be shared. Thus solutions provided by using multi-
photon protocol are proposed in the next chapter of this report. 
4. Furthermore, the BB84 has several steps after the quantum transmission process. 
These steps include: sifting, error estimation, error correction, and privacy 
amplification. Compared to the cases using a multi-photon tolerant protocol, these 
steps are seen as an overhead associated with the BB84 protocol execution in 
addition to the associated cost of implementing them, where a shorter key will be 
derived. Furthermore, multiple agents should be present to implement these steps. 
A multi-agent based approach with a lesser number of needed agents will be 
discussed later in this chapter. 
The first proposed multi-photon tolerant protocol is the three-stage protocol. It 
was first proposed by Subhash Kak in 2006; this protocol can obviate some of the known 
limitations of the BB84 protocol such as the distance, data rate, and single photon 
requirement. One can think of the three-stage protocol as a candidate to replace the BB84 
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in the quantum handshake discussed in the precious chapter. The three-stage protocol 
described in Chapter 3 has two other variants: the three-stage protocol using an 
initialization vector and implementing a chaining mode between the keys agreed on 
(three-stage protocol using four variables) discussed in Chapter 3, and the single-stage 
protocol where an initialization vector is used as the set of initial transformations to be 
applied on the message transmitted. In the case of the single-stage protocol one 
transmission only is needed to convey a message. The next part of this chapter will present 
a discussion of the integration the three-stage protocol and its variants into the IEEE 
802.11 quantum handshake. 
III.  Hybrid three-stage protocol 
The three-stage protocol is composed of three consecutive quantum 
communications that require a line-of-sight between the STA and the AP. One can think 
of implementing a hybrid approach where a reduced number of transmissions requiring a 
line of sight can be used.  
 
ALICE
ALICE
BOB
BOB
X+α 
X+α+β 
X+β 
 
Figure 31: The three-stage protocol 
   
Form Figure 31 one can see that in case the second transmission of the three-stage 
protocol is made on a multi-photon level the protocol can be said to be unconditionally 
secure. In this case, an intruder will not be able to measure the value of 𝑋 + 𝛼 + 𝛽, thus 
cannot calculate the value of the message even if the first and last transmissions are made 
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over the classical channel. In addition, one must observe that in case the second 
transmission is done over a quantum channel the third one should be done on a quantum 
channel as well. Since Alice will not have enough photon to measure the polarization sent 
over the second channel she cannot continue with the communication unless it is still 
using the quantum channel. So in this case the three-stage protocol proceeds as follows: 
Step 1: Alice sends the polarization value of the first transmission using the classical 
channel. The value of the polarization is equal to 𝑋 + 𝛼, where X is the value of 
the corresponding bit of the key (90° for bit value 1 and 0° for bit value 0) and 𝛼 
is the rotation applied by Alice. 
Step 2: Bob receives the value of the polarization, generates a number of photons having 
the corresponding polarization and applies his rotation transformation and sends 
using the quantum channel the set of photons having a polarization of 𝑋 + 𝛼 + 𝛽 
back to Alice, where 𝛽 is the polarization rotation applied by Bob.  
Step 3: Alice removes her transformation and sends using the quantum channel the set of 
photons of polarization equal to  𝑋 + 𝛽 . 
Step 4: Bob will receive the set of photons from Alice removes his transformation and 
measure the initial value of X. 
i. Quantum handshake using the three-stage protocol 
 
If we replace the BB84 protocol in the IEEE 802.11i protocol (described in the 
previous section) by the three-stage protocol the only part affected will be the quantum 
handshake. The quantum handshake using the three-stage protocol is as shown in Figure 
32. 
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STA AP
Send polarization value X+alpha
Flow 14
                   Switch to Quantum channel
Send photon with X+alpha+beta 
polarization
Send photons with polarization X+beta
      Flow 15
 Flow 16
Error estimation and correction
Flow 17
PTK recovery
Q-MIC
Flow 18
Success,Q-MIC
Flow 19
 
 
Figure 32: Quantum handshake using the three-stage protocol 
As shown in the Figure 32 the quantum handshake using the three-stage protocol requires 
fewer message flows between the AP and the STA.  
ii.  Quantum handshake using the four-variable three-stage protocol 
 
The three-stage protocol using four-variable is described in [77]. In this protocol 
an initialization vector 𝐼𝑉 is used to enhance the security of the three-stage protocol. Then 
a chaining mode is implemented in order to update the value of the polarization vector. 
In this case the PMK can be used as an initialization vector and for later transmission, the 
Switch to Classical channel 
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PTK can be used to update the value of the initialization vector. The three-stage protocol 
using four variables was described in details in Chapter 3.The integration of this variation 
of the three-stage protocol into the quantum handshake is shown in Figure 33.  
   
 
Figure 33: Quantum handshake using the four variable three-stage protocols 
 
iii.  Quantum handshake using the single-stage protocol 
 
In the single-stage protocol, it is assumed that Alice and Bob use complex 
transformations known to both Alice and Bob (in our case STA and AP). Thus, rather 
than using three transmissions to convey the key STA and AP can share the key using 
one transmission. Prior to the communication Alice and Bob should have a set of 
transformations that they will be applying to the messages exchanged among them. This 
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set of transformation in this case can be derived from the PMK and updated according to 
the value of the shared PTK. 
The steps of the single-stage protocol are as follows [121]: 
Step 1: Alice applies her complex transformation on the message and sends 𝑈𝐴(𝑋) to    
Bob. 
Step 2: Bob removes the transformation applied by Alice, by applying its transpose 
complex conjugate since he has a prior knowledge of this transformation. 
Figure 34 shows the quantum handshake of the IEEE 802.11i protocol using the one-
stage protocol. 
STA AP
                   Switch to Quantum channel
Send photon with U(X) polarization
      Flow 14
Error estimation and correction
Flow 15
PTK recovery
Q-MIC
Flow 16
Success,Q-MIC
Flow 17
                   Switch to Classical channel
 
Figure 34:The quantum handshake of the IEEE 802.11i using the one-stage protocol 
 
iv.  Hardware Implementation 
 
Currently there are no commercially available Wi-Fi specific wireless devices that 
support quantum transmission. Thus the quantum transmission in [119] has been 
established as a separate project aligned to an existing QKD research [122-124] where 
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the quantum transmissions have been practically implemented over free space. The setup 
between AP and STA is shown in Figure 35. 
Photon 
receiver
Photon 
transmitter
AP STA
Channel
switch
Channel
switch
Wi-Fi
Network
Photon 
transmission
 
Figure 35: Implementation setup of the IEEE 802.11i integrated with QKD 
 
IV. Software implementation 
The implementation was done using a multi agent system. An agent is a 
sophisticated computer program capable of acting autonomously to accomplish tasks on 
behalf of its users, across open and distributed environments [125, 126]. It has the 
following characteristics: autonomy, mobility, rationality, reactivity, inferential 
capability, pro-activeness, and social ability… etc. 
Together multiple agents form a Multi-agent System (MAS) which offer several 
advantages over a centralized approach. They can distribute computational resources and 
capabilities across a network. Multiple agents enhance overall system performance, 
efficiency, reliability, extensibility, robustness, maintainability, responsiveness, 
flexibility, and reuse.  
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ii. Multi-agent Approach in BB84 
 
The QKD based IEEE 802.11i using BB84 can be represented using the agents shown in 
Figure 36.  
 
Co-ordination 
agent
BB’84 protocol 
agent
802.11 
agent
802.1X 
agent
Sifting agent 
Error estimation agent
Privacy amplificationagent
Quantum communication agent
Reconciliation agent
 
Figure 36: Multi-agent approach to BB84 in IEEE 802.11i. Source: [119]  
 
The functionalities of each agent can be described as follows [119]:  
802.11 Agent: This agent performs the 802.11 Association and Authentication.  
802.1X Agent: This agent carries out the 802.1X authentication. It is also capable of 
making decisions on suspicious messages from adversaries similar to what 802.11 Agent 
does. 
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BB84 Agent: This agent is to act as the coordinating agent to execute the BB84 QKD 
protocol. It communicates with 4 other agents to execute the BB84 protocol. 
Sifting Agent: This agent effectuates the sifting stage of the BB84 protocol. 
Error Estimation Agent: This agent verifies if the error level of the quantum transmission 
is acceptable or not. 
Reconciliation Agent: This agent executes the reconciliation process of the BB84 
protocol to remove incorrect bits and obtain an error free key at either end. 
Privacy Amplification Agent: This agent effectuates the Privacy amplification of the 
BB84 protocol. The key obtained by this agent is the “unconditionally secured” PTK key 
used to derive the rest of the key hierarchy. 
Coordination Agent: The coordination agent communicates with all other agents and 
assures that monitoring efforts and management of internal requests with other agents are 
handled consistently within a specific transmission. In other words, the coordination 
agent offers an outline of all communications performed between agents. 
The operational procedure of the multi-agent approach is shown in the Figure 37. 
120 
 
Co-
ordination 
agent
BB’84 
protocol 
agent
802.11 
agent
802.1X 
agent
Sifting agent 
Error estimation agent
Privacy 
amplificationagent
Quantum 
communication agent
Reconciliation agent
Co-
ordination 
agent
BB’84 
protocol 
agent
802.11 
agent
802.1X 
agent
Sifting agent 
Error estimation agent
Privacy 
amplificationagent
Quantum 
communication agent
Reconciliation agent
Enterprise1: Access Point Enterprise2: STA
 
Figure 37: Operation of a multi-agent approach 
 
Each time a new STA enters into the network, AP creates an enterprise 
corresponding to the new STA in order to facilitate the communication. On the other hand 
the STA also creates an instance of this enterprise. Since the STA communicates with 
only one AP at a time, it will only have one enterprise; however, the AP’s side will contain 
many enterprises according to how many STA it is dealing with. The two enterprises that 
make and the communication procedure are shown in Figure 36.   
iii. Multi-agent approach in Multi-photon Tolerant Protocols  
 
One can use a multi-agent approach to implement the three-stage protocol and its 
variant in an IEEE 802.11i network. Compared to its BB84 counterpart, such 
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implementation will need fewer agents to perform the actions required in order to share 
a PTK between AP and STA. The agents are shown in Figure 38: 
Co-ordination 
agent
Three-stage 
protocol agent
802.11 
agent
802.1X 
agent
Initialization vector updating agent
Quantum communication agent
Error correction and estimation 
agent
Polarization value agent
Flow 14 
agent
Polarization 
transformation
 
Figure 38: Agents used for the three-stage (and its variants) 
 
As we can see the three-stage protocol and its variants do not need the presence 
of: sifting agent, reconciliation agent, and privacy amplification agent. On the other hand, 
it is useful for the software implementation of the three-stage protocol and its variants to 
have an initialization vector updating agent that will compute the value of the new 
initialization vector to be used at the next session. In addition to a polarization value 
agent, this agent has two wrapper agents; the first is for sending the value of the 
polarization of the flow 14 of figures 32 and 33 and the second  is for applying the 
polarization transformation on each side of the communication. It is worth noting that the 
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polarization value agent of the AP and STA need not to communicate at any point in the 
session. 
iv.  Analysis of the quantum handshake using three-stage protocol and its variants 
 
Compared to the quantum handshake using BB84, the quantum handshake using three-
stage and its variants offers the following advantages: 
1. On the positive side, the three-stage protocol and its variants are multi-photon 
tolerant protocols. Thus, AP and STA do not need to be equipped with single 
photon generators and detectors. However, the proposed approach requires the 
presence of a high speed polarization modulator at both AP and STA sides.  
2. On the positive side, the three-stage protocol offers a higher data rate and a longer 
communication distance between AP and STA. Since the three-stage protocol is 
a multi-photon tolerant protocol it can offer a longer distance of communication 
since a light pulse containing several photons can travel for a longer time. 
Furthermore, the three-stage protocol doesn’t require sifting thus the data rate will 
be higher compared to that of the BB84 and one can have a better assumption of 
how many bits should be sent to retrieve the final key.  
3. Compared to BB84, three-stage protocol and three-stage protocol using four 
variables will require two flows to be sent over the quantum channel (flows 15 
and 16 of figures 32 and 33). However, the single-stage protocol does not impose 
this requirement. 
 
123 
 
V. Conclusion  
Security risks are inherent in wireless network; the major source of risks in such 
networks is the communication medium, which is open to intruders. Till date, many 
efforts have been put in to address security issues in wireless networks. This chapter has 
presented a method to provide wireless networks with a security level comparable to that 
of QKD. This chapter has discussed the integration of the BB84 protocol into the four-
way handshake of the IEEE 802.11i protocol along with its shortcomings. On the positive 
side, quantum handshake provides the Wi-Fi networks with unconditional security. On 
the other hand, quantum handshake using the BB84 imposes several limitations such as 
short distances, low data rates etc. This chapter has proposed the integration of multi-
stage protocols into the four-way handshake of IEEE 802.11i. Multi-stage protocols offer 
several advantages compared to its BB84 counterpart. The mode of operation of the 
proposed quantum handshake (using multi-stage protocol) has been discussed along with 
its multi-agent implementation approach. Providing the four-way handshake with the 
capability of implementing the multi-stage protocol offers a quantum level of security 
meanwhile achieving higher data rates, longer distances, while using a larger average 
number of photons per pulse. The only disadvantage of such an approach is the 
requirement of at least a single line-of-sight between AP and STA. Furthermore, one can 
think of implementing QKD in the key distribution of Wi-Max networks [127], since such 
networks use keys hierarchy similar to that in IEEE 802.11i.     
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Chapter 8: Conclusion and Future Work 
This dissertation has presented a study of the security and performance of a 
quantum communication system using multi-stage, multi-photon tolerant protocols. This 
dissertation has been divided into three main parts. The first part has analyzed the security 
of multi-stage protocols and proposed several approaches to secure these protocols in 
order to provide quantum-secure communication. The second part has discussed the 
performance of the single-stage protocol in a fiber optics medium and shown the effect 
of an increase in the average photon number to be used on the QBER, the key rate, and 
the distance of communication. The third part has introduced an application of the multi-
stage protocol in the four-way handshake of the IEEE 802.11.  
First, this dissertation has proposed a generalized multi-stage multi-photon 
tolerant protocol for quantum secure communication. The security of the multi-stage 
protocol is based on the fact that while a legitimate receiver only needs to distinguish 
between two orthogonal polarization states, an intruder has to distinguish among an 
infinite number of possible polarization states. In other words, while the receiver would 
need only one photon to do so, an intruder would need to siphon off a minimum number 
𝑁 of photons per stage. This dissertation has also proposed a key/message expansion 
scheme associated with the multi-stage protocol which has been proposed. The 
key/message expansion scheme provides a countermeasure to any man-in-the-middle 
attack that can be launched on the system. In addition, in an implementation of the 
generalized multi-stage multi-photon tolerant protocol as well as its key/message 
expansion scheme has been proposed. These implementations have been done in a 
laboratory setup using passive optical components. Furthermore, the results presented in 
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this dissertation set an upper bound on the number of photons at 3𝑁 ≤ 4.5 in the case of 
the three-stage protocol using Fock states. And 𝑁 ≈ 10  when coherent states are used in 
conjunction with the key/message expansion protocol; however, 𝑁 < 4 is the limit when 
coherent states are used without any prior authentication. Several attacks have been 
analyzed.  These are Trojan horse attack, man-in-the-middle attack, PNS attack through 
measurement and Helstrom discrimination, amplification attack. 
 
Second, this dissertation has investigated the performance aspects of a practical 
quantum secure communication using multi-photon tolerant protocols. It has also 
presented the results of a study of multi-photon tolerant multi-stage protocols, security 
aspects as well as challenges to the practical implementation. In this dissertation, coherent 
non-decoying quantum states have been used to transfer the encoded bits from Alice to 
Bob. The maximum number of photons that Alice can use to encode her bit was varied 
from 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 1 to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 12. An optimum value 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 has been found for each 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 and 
as a result a relationship between both values has been derived. Also, a linear relationship 
has been obtained between the maximum distance that can be achieved and 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡. 
However, by examining the relationship between the maximum key rate as a function of 
𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡, one notices that the relationship is far from linear and K reaches a saturation limit 
at around 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 4.8 – 5.8 that corresponds to 𝑁𝑚𝑎𝑥 = 8 − 10 photons.  
The relationship between the secret key generation rates for 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, 2.1, 
and 2.6 has been calculated with respect to both losses and distances over a fiber optical 
channel. This dissertation has shown that at 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 2.6, the key generation rates are higher 
than the cases were 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, and 2.1. It is worth noting that the BB84 operates at 
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𝜇 = 0.1, which is much less than the case of the multi-stage protocol. The QKD multi-
stage protocol using coherent state uses an average of 1.5 photons per stage. However, in 
case it is used as a communication protocol the average number of photon number per 
stage is 3.3.  Furthermore, this dissertation has shown that the QBER in case of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 
2.6 exerts same characteristics as in the cases of 𝜇𝑜𝑝𝑡 = 0.95, 1.5, and 2.1; the only 
difference is the distance at which the value of QBER increases sharply. The calculations 
derived in this dissertation can be generalized to evaluate the performance of any multi-
stage QKD or communication protocol.   
Third, this dissertation has addressed the security risks inherent in the IEEE 
802.11 wireless network by presenting a method to provide wireless networks with a 
security level comparable to that of QKD. This dissertation has discussed the integration 
of the BB84 protocol into the four-way handshake of the IEEE 802.11i protocol along 
with its shortcomings. On the positive side, quantum handshake provides the Wi-Fi 
networks with unconditional security. On the other hand, quantum handshake using the 
BB84 imposes several limitations such as short distances, low data rates etc.  This 
dissertation has proposed the integration of multi-stage protocols into the four-way 
handshake of IEEE 802.11i. Multi-stage protocols offer several advantages compared to 
its BB84 counterpart. The mode of operation of the proposed quantum handshake (using 
multi-stage protocol) has been discussed along with its multi-agent implementation 
approach. Providing the four-way handshake with the capability of implementing the 
multi-stage protocol offers a quantum level of security meanwhile achieving higher data 
rates, longer distances, while using a larger average number of photons per pulse. The 
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only disadvantage of such an approach is the requirement of at least a single line-of-sight 
between AP and STA. 
Future work would potentially expand on two different aspects of the multi-stage 
protocol proposed in this dissertation: the theoretical aspect as well as the implementation 
and applications aspect. On the theoretical aspect, a further generalization of the study of 
the performance of the multi-stage protocol over Fiber optics as well as Free Space Optics 
can be addressed. The performance over FSO is expected to follow the same patterns of 
the investigation presented in Chapter 7. However, the distance of communication over 
FSO is expected to be less than that of FO due to the introduction of geometrical losses 
in the case of FSO. In addition, implementation over FO as well as FSO using the 
calculated secure average photon number can be designed and executed in a laboratory 
environment as a start. Then such implementations can be conducted in more realistic 
environments where random noise affects the transmission. Furthermore, other 
applications of the multi-stage protocol such as terrestrial ground FSO links, FO 
networks, FSO space transmission can be theoretically studied as well as implemented in 
the context of future work based on the results presented in this dissertation.  
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